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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In February 2001, Joseph Raymond Hanas, a nineteen-year-old Michigan 
resident, was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.1  He pled 
guilty to the charge in exchange for a drug court referral.2  The Genesee County 
Drug Court placed Hanas on probation, which he violated in January 2003 when he 
was ticketed for underage possession of alcohol.3  As a condition of remaining in the 
drug court’s deferred sentencing program, he was ordered into a long-term 
residential drug and alcohol treatment program called “Inner City Christian 
Outreach.”4  His only alternative to this placement was imprisonment.5  Just prior to 
taking up residence at Christian Outreach, Hanas was admonished by his probation 
officer: “Remember, the rules of [Christian Outreach] are the rules of the court.”6 
Christian Outreach was unlike anything Hanas expected.7  There were no 
substance abuse counselors on staff.8  Indeed, Hanas was even forbidden to attend 
Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A.)9 meetings.10  He quickly realized that the program 
                                                                
1Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Hanas v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 1135 (2005) (No. 04-
1461), 2005 WL 1060940.  The Supreme Court denied the petition for the writ of certiorari; to 
date, no written opinion has been published in this case at any level.   
2Id. 
3Id. 
4Id.  
5Id.  
6Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 12, Hanas v. Genesee 
County Adult Prob. Dep’t, No. 05-CV-74612 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2005), available at 
http://www.aclumich.org/pdf/briefs/Hanashabeasbrief.pdf.  The probation officer’s comment 
was recorded in the hearing’s transcript. 
7See id. at 2. 
8Id. at 3 n.3. 
9Alcoholics Anonymous represents itself as follows in the preamble read before most A.A. 
meetings: 
Alcoholics Anonymous® is a fellowship of men and women who share their 
experience, strength and hope with each other that they may solve their common 
problem and help others to recover from alcoholism.  The only requirement for 
membership is a desire to stop drinking.  There are no dues or fees for A.A. 
membership; we are self-supporting through our own contributions.  A.A. is not allied 
with any sect, denomination, politics, organization or institution; does not wish to 
engage in any controversy, neither endorses nor opposes any causes.  Our primary 
purpose is to stay sober and help other alcoholics to achieve sobriety. 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss4/8
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was pervasively religious; the staff seemed much more focused on converting him to 
the Pentecostal faith than on helping him overcome his addiction.11  Staff members 
mocked Hanas’s Catholic beliefs, calling his faith a form of witchcraft.12  His rosary 
and prayer book, which his mother had given to him, were confiscated.13  Instead, he 
was given a Pentecostal bible and instructed to read it for seven hours every day.14  
He was also forced to regularly attend Pentecostal religious services15 and was given 
tests on Pentecostal principles.16  His mother, his aunt, and Catholic priests and 
deacons whom Hanas had requested to see were barred from visiting him at the 
facility.17  When Hanas’s aunt called to protest, she was told by Christian Outreach’s 
director, Pastor Rottier, that Hanas “gave up his right to freedom of religion when he 
was placed in this program.”18  
After unwittingly violating one of the center’s rules, Hanas was forced into a 
three-day “word fast” during which time he was required to remain silent and read 
the Bible continuously.19  Rottier informed Hanas that in order to graduate from his 
program, he would have to proceed up to the altar with the other residents and 
proclaim that he had been “saved.”20  Hanas was repeatedly threatened that he would 
be “washed of the program” and sent to prison if he failed to obey Rottier’s orders.21  
“I needed help,” said Hanas.  “Instead I was forced to practice someone else’s 
religion.”22  
                                                          
Alcoholics Anonymous: Information on A.A., http://aa.org/en_information_aa.cfm (last 
visited May 28, 2006).  Alcoholics Anonymous is the original twelve-step program upon 
which many others have been founded.   
10Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 6, at 3 n.3.  
Under Christian Outreach’s policy, residents were not allowed to attend A.A. meetings until 
they had been at the facility for ten months.  Id. 
11See id. at 2-4. 
12Id. at 3. 
13Id. at 1; see also Defendant’s Application for Leave to Appeal at 4, People v. Hanas, 691 
N.W.2d 456 (Mich. 2005) (No. 126595) (on file with author) (court denied application). 
14Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 6, at 3. 
15Id. 
16Id.  
17Id. at 1. 
18Id. at 3; see also Defendant’s Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 13, at 4. 
19Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 6, at 3. 
20Id. at 3-4. 
21Defendant’s Delayed Application for Leave to Appeal at 5, People v. Hanas, No. 254434 
(Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2004) (on file with author) (court denied application).  The 
aforementioned facts of Hanas’s ongoing case, averred in several different motions, were 
supported by sworn affidavits and were never disputed at hearing.  Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, supra note 1, at 5 n.4. 
22Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Michigan Court Punishes Catholic Man 
for Refusing Conversion to Pentecostal Faith in Drug Rehab Program (July 20, 2004), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/religion/frb/16354prs20040720.html?ht=. 
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Most treatment centers perform admirable work, and some legitimately claim 
impressive rates of success.23  Nonetheless, there are others that harbor ulterior 
motives and engage in what some critics have called “stealth evangelism.”24  
Specifically, some religious and quasi-religious groups have seen and taken 
advantage of an opportunity to attempt to convert troubled young men and women to 
their faiths at a time when these youths may be at the most vulnerable points of their 
lives.25  Other treatment centers’ administrators have pure motives for wanting to 
impart their faith to their residents, and see no harm in doing so.26  While there is 
nothing inherently wrong with turning to spiritual guidance for help in overcoming 
addiction,27 the existence of such facilities as Christian Outreach and their ability to 
receive federal funds or contract with local government presents important 
constitutional questions. 
Whether faith-based substance abuse treatments are effective28 is certainly a valid 
question in its rightful place, but it is not the inquiry pursued here.  Rather, this Note 
argues that a drug court’s act of assigning unwilling offenders to twelve-step29 or 
                                                                
23National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism of the National Institutes of Health, 
Does Alcoholism Treatment Work?, http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/FAQs/General-English/ 
FAQ7.htm (last visited May 28, 2006). 
24Telephone interview by Kathiann M. Kowalski with Steven Freeman, Legal Director, 
Anti-Defamation League, in New York, NY (Dec. 2, 2003) (on file with author). 
25See Constitutional Role of Faith-Based Organizations in Competitions for Fed. Social 
Service Funds: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 46-47, 54-55 (2001), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/ 
pdfs/printers/107th/72981.pdf [hereinafter Hearing] (comments of Rep. Jerrold Nadler, 
Ranking Member, House Subcomm. on the Constitution, and Rep. Barney Frank, Member, 
House Subcomm. on the Constitution).  
26See id. at 42 (comment of Rep. Steve Chabot, Chairman, House Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, and testimony of Mr. Ira C. Lupu, Louis Harkey Mayo Research Professor of 
Law, The George Washington School of Law). 
27To the contrary—spiritual help has been instrumental in achieving sobriety for millions 
of people worldwide.  See, e.g., Kawanza L. Griffin et al., Faith Can Help Fight Drug Abuse, 
Study Suggests; Research Says the Religious are Less Likely to Drink, Use Illicit Substances, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 17, 2001, at 01B, available at http://www.jsonline.com/ 
lifestyle/religion/nov01/drugs17111601.asp.  The current membership of Alcoholics 
Anonymous alone is presently estimated at over two million.  Alcoholics Anonymous: A.A. at 
a Glance, http://www.aa.org/en_information_aa.cfm?PageID=10 (last visited May 28, 2006).  
28For what it’s worth, your author believes they are, in fact, quite effective. 
29In the highest courts at which the issue has been decided, twelve-step treatment 
programs and groups (i.e., A.A., N.A., C.A., etc.) have been determined to be religious 
activities that the State cannot legally compel individuals to attend.  In other words, requiring 
participation in a twelve-step group is an establishment of religion prohibited by the First 
Amendment.  See, e.g., Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 332-33 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that 
A.A./N.A. parole requirements violate the Establishment Clause as a matter of law); Warner v. 
Orange County Dep’t of Prob., 173 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1999) (requiring A.A. meeting 
attendance as a condition of probation is unconstitutional); Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 474 
(7th Cir. 1996) (holding prison policy unconstitutional where nonattendance at N.A. meetings 
is penalized with a higher security risk classification and parole eligibility is negatively 
affected); Turner v. Hickman, 342 F. Supp. 2d 887, 895-97 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss4/8
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otherwise religiously-based residential treatment centers violates the Establishment 
Clause guarantee.  Specifically, such centers regulate the offenders’ beliefs and 
compel them to affirm whatever tenets are professed at the individual treatment 
center.  Moreover, a court’s subsequent act of threatening or actually imposing 
criminal sanctions upon offenders for refusing to complete such treatment programs 
constitutes punishment for refusing to be religiously indoctrinated by a program 
mandated by the state.  Regulations currently imposed upon federally funded faith-
based treatment centers30 adequately safeguard offenders’ First Amendment rights in 
these respects, but those regulations must be made applicable to all treatment centers 
that accept offenders from any court across the country.31   
                                                          
parole eligibility conditioned upon N.A. participation is unconstitutional); Ross v. Keelings, 2 
F. Supp. 2d 810, 817-18 (E.D. Va. 1998) (applying the “per se rule adopted by the Second and 
Seventh Circuits” in Warner and Kerr); Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 106 (N.Y. Ct. 
App. 1996) (holding that family visitation privileges cannot be withheld for failure to attend 
twelve-step-based group); Evans v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles, 956 S.W.2d 478, 483-84 (Tenn. 
1997) (holding that parole eligibility conditioned upon A.A. participation is unconstitutional).  
But see Boyd v. Coughlin, 914 F. Supp. 828, 833 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (“A.A. . . . references to a 
‘God’ or ‘higher power’ . . . do not reflect any concept of organized religion, but rather, reflect 
a belief that some form of spirituality is necessary to recovery.  [Because no] controlling 
decision . . . equates spirituality with religion, [there is no violation of] the First 
Amendment.”); Feasel v. Willis, 904 F. Supp. 582, 583 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (requiring A.A. 
participation during imprisonment is permissible because there is no established legal 
principle that A.A. is a forced indoctrination of religion); O'Connor v. California, 855 F. Supp. 
303, 304 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that required self-help program attendance for persons 
convicted of drunk driving, where A.A. is the principal program available, does not violate the 
Establishment Clause).  The United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on this critical issue, 
and it has passed up several opportunities to do so in the above-cited cases.  For excellent 
discussions on this topic, see Max Dehn, How it Works: Sobriety, Sentencing, the Constitution, 
and Alcoholics Anonymous—A Perspective from AA’s Founding Community, 10 MICH. ST. U. 
J. MED. & L. 255 (2006); Byron K. Henry, Note & Comment, In “A Higher Power” We 
Trust: Alcoholics Anonymous as a Condition of Probation and Establishment of Religion, 3 
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 443 (1997); Michael G. Honeymar, Jr., Note, Alcoholics Anonymous 
as a Condition of Drunk Driving Probation: When Does it Amount to Establishment of 
Religion?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 437 (1997). 
30Charitable Choice Regulations Applicable to States Receiving Substance Abuse 
Prevention and Treatment Block Grants and/or Projects for Assistance in Transition from 
Homelessness Grants, 42 C.F.R. §§ 54.1-.13 (2006); Charitable Choice Regulations 
Applicable to States, Local Governments, and Religious Organizations Receiving 
Discretionary Funding Under Title V of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 290aa, et 
seq., for Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Services, 42 C.F.R. §§ 54a.1-.13 (2006). 
31To illustrate, St. Christopher’s Halfway House, http://www.stchris-br.com (last visited 
May 28, 2006), in Baton Rouge, La., is a twelve-step-based treatment facility, costing $3,000 
per month.  It receives no governmental aid, but does contract with the local drug court for 
client referrals.  Although not anywhere close to being as pervasively religious as an 
institution as Christian Outreach, St. Christopher’s use of the twelve-step approach is 
sufficient to subject it to Establishment Clause scrutiny.  See cases cited supra note 29.  
Although St. Christopher’s is actually eligible to receive governmental aid, its administrators 
have chosen not to pursue that avenue, because doing so would mean they might have to alter 
their treatment approach to conform to the Charitable Choice regulations currently applicable 
only to federally funded treatment centers.  See C.F.R. sections cited supra note 30; Telephone 
interview with Preston W. Elder, Board-Certified Substance Abuse and Addiction Counselor 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
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Genesee County’s drug court is one of over 1,600 similar specialty courts across 
the country that aim to stop the substance abuse presumed to be a root cause of much 
criminal activity.32  Drug courts generally require a defendant to plead guilty to the 
criminal charge, or the court defers the charge pending treatment.33  In exchange for 
successfully completing a treatment regimen, such as attending twelve-step 
meetings, providing urinalysis samples, and reporting frequently34 to the court or a 
probation officer for a period of time (usually around twelve to eighteen months),35 
the court usually dismisses the original charge or sets aside the sentence.36 
When an offender falls short of meeting his or her obligations under the drug 
court agreement, the judge has the discretion to order the offender into residential 
treatment.37  The treatment programs into which these offenders are ordered vary 
widely.38  The vast majority, however, employ a twelve-step treatment method or are 
faith-based to at least some extent.39  Many offenders do not object to such programs, 
especially where they are consistent with the defendant’s own religious traditions.40  
                                                          
& Program Director, St. Christopher’s Halfway House (Jan. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Interview 
with Preston W. Elder].  This Note argues that, at a minimum, institutions like St. 
Christopher’s should be made to comply with those regulations.  That is, regardless of whether 
a facility receives governmental aid, the fact that a facility accepts drug court clients sentenced 
to residential treatment is sufficient to mandate that residents’ First Amendment rights be 
protected.   
32Criminal Justice Policy Coalition, Mental Health and Drug Court, http://www.cjpc.org/ 
hhcr_menhealth_drugcourts.htm (last visited May 28, 2006); see also Donald P. Lay, Rehab 
Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2004, at A2. 
33Emily M. Gallas, Comment, Endorsing Religion: Drug Courts and the 12-Step Recovery 
Support Program, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1063, 1069 (2004). 
34Depending on their progress, offenders may be required to report as often as every week 
or as rarely as every month.  Telephone interview with Jesslyn Wilson, Co-director, Greater 
Cleveland Drug Court Program (Jan. 23, 2006) [hereinafter Interview with Jesslyn Wilson]. 
35JOHN S. GOLDKAMP, MICHAEL D. WHITE, & JENNIFER B. ROBINSON, AN HONEST 
CHANCE: PERSPECTIVES ON DRUG COURTS (2002), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/html/bja/ 
honestchance/index.html (follow “Court Responses” hyperlink).  
36Gallas, supra note 33, at 1069. 
37Id. at 1069-70.  Sentencing offenders to substance abuse treatment facilities and twelve-
step group meetings is not unique to drug courts; regular criminal courts occasionally engage 
in such sentencing practices in a variety of situations (e.g., domestic violence cases and 
probation or parole violations).  JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN 
DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 148 (2001); Interview with Jesslyn Wilson, supra note 34.  The vast 
majority of treatment referrals, however, come from drug courts.  Id. 
38Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Andrew J. Cowin, The Heritage Foundation, The Case Against 
More Funds for Drug Treatment (May 17, 1991), http://heritage.org/Research/Budget/ 
BG829.cfm.  
39STANTON PEELE, CHARLES BUFE, & ARCHIE BRODSKY, RESISTING TWELVE-STEP 
COERCION: HOW TO FIGHT FORCED PARTICIPATION IN AA, NA, OR 12-STEP TREATMENT 22 
(2000).  “A large, recent survey of alcohol treatment providers reported that 93% of the 450 
facilities it surveyed utilized the twelve-step approach.”  Id.  
40See Derek P. Apanovitch, Note, Religion and Rehabilitation: The Requisition of God by 
the State, 47 DUKE L.J. 785, 787 (1998). 
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2006] PRAYER OR PRISON 677 
For others who do not share those beliefs or who seek a secular solution to their 
substance abuse, however, such sentencing practices present a legal dilemma, 
especially for indigent defendants who cannot afford alternative treatment facilities.41  
Usually offenders are given some degree of choice with regard to the program they 
will ultimately enter.42  However, Hanas had no funds to pay for treatment.43  
Christian Outreach was available free of charge, and, as such, it was the only option 
the judge presented to him.44 
This Note analyzes the constitutionality of ordering an offender into a long-term 
residential twelve-step or otherwise faith-based alcohol and drug rehabilitation 
program, regardless of whether the offender objects to the religious nature of the 
program.  Part II reviews the history of America’s drug courts and their affiliated 
rehabilitation centers and offers the reader a glimpse inside a typical facility.  Part III 
presents an introductory overview of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, 
the constitutional passages most often implicated in cases dealing with twelve-step or 
faith-based treatment centers.  Special attention is given to the Establishment Clause 
and the various tests the Supreme Court uses to adjudicate church-and-state matters.  
Part IV examines the several recent cases dealing with faith-based treatment centers.  
Part V offers some practical suggestions on how drug courts may properly direct 
offenders into residential treatment while complying with constitutional mandates. 
II.  THE INTERACTION BETWEEN DRUG COURTS AND TREATMENT CENTERS 
A.  The History and Efficacy of Drug Courts in the United States 
At their most fundamental level, drug courts offer offenders the option of court-
monitored substance abuse treatment as an alternative to the normal adjudicative 
process.45  These specialty courts combine the close supervision and structure of the 
judicial process with the resources of substance abuse treatment services.46  Today’s 
drug courts owe their existence primarily to the crack-cocaine epidemic of the 1980s 
                                                                
41As one court-ordered treatment center resident expressed herself, “I find it 
unconscionable that the criminal justice system has the power to coerce American citizens to 
accept ideas that are anathema to them.”  PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 42. 
42Gallas, supra note 33, at 1083-84. 
43Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 6, at 2.   
44Id.  At Hanas’s hearing, the only program suggested as having space available was the 
Inner City Christian Outreach Residential Program.  Id.  Judge Ransom subsequently 
explained that, although other residential programs might have been available, they all charged 
fees that Hanas could not afford: “He could get into [Christian Outreach] without any money.  
There were other options, but he didn’t have any money.  He couldn’t pay—he couldn’t pay 
the fee.  One of the programs is a $300 fee.  He couldn’t come up with the $300.”  Id. at 2 n.1. 
45NOLAN, supra note 37, at 39. 
46See generally Gallas, supra note 33, at 1067-72; Richard S. Gebelein, The Rebirth of 
Rehabilitation: Promise and Perils of Drug Courts, SENT’G & CORRECTIONS: ISSUES FOR 21ST 
CENTURY, May 2000, at 1-7, available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/181412.pdf 
(published by the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Justice Programs and National Institute of 
Justice). 
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that flooded the nation’s courts, jails, and prisons.47  The first drug court emerged in 
Dade County, Florida in 1989 and emphasized “drug treatment, responsibility, and 
accountability.”48  The judicially led grassroots movement first spread to California 
and then across the nation, and it has since turned international.49 
Drug courts fundamentally alter the traditional adjudicative process as well as the 
relationships among the typical actors.50  Attorneys no longer operate within an 
adversarial context.51  Rather, both the prosecuting and defense lawyers are expected 
to work together in a “team approach.”52  Defendants (usually referred to as “clients” 
of the drug court) often address the judge directly rather than through their 
attorneys.53  Sometimes, the lawyers do not even appear in court.54  
Despite a lack of uniform national standards and practices for drug courts, 
numerous studies indicate lower recidivism and greater success with sobriety for 
drug court participants compared with similar offenders who proceed through the 
normal criminal adjudicative process.55  Drug court graduates are also much more 
likely to secure employment,56 and female participants are more likely to give birth 
                                                                
47Andrew Armstrong, Comment, Drug Courts and the De Facto Legalization of Drug Use 
for Participants in Residential Treatment Facilities, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133, 139 
(2003); see also NOLAN, supra note 37, at 44, 46.  As one drug court judge explains, “Drug 
offenders were being repeatedly recycled through the criminal justice system—a system, as 
the judges see it, that did nothing to rehabilitate offenders of their root problem.  What we 
were doing before simply was not working.”  Id. at 106. 
48Gallas, supra note 33, at 1067.  
49UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, DRUG TREATMENT COURTS WORK! 
(2005), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/cnd_dtc_flyer.pdf; OFFICE OF JUSTICE 
PROGRAMS, DRUG COURTS PROGRAM OFFICE, FACT SHEET (1995), available at http://www. 
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/drugfact.pdf. 
50NOLAN, supra note 37, at 79. 
51Id. at 72.  As one drug court judge observed, “There is little or no place for the normal 
adversarial lawyer in [the drug court] context.”  Id.  The radically redefined roles among the 
actors have led to problems in implementing drug courts in several jurisdictions, but are 
typically overcome through experience.  Id. 
52Id. at 72.  Some observers fear that the absence of the traditional defense role may 
imperil defendants’ rights or put them at a disadvantage in future cases.  Id. 
53Id. 
54Id. at 40.   
55Across numerous studies, drug court participants consistently recidivate at lower rates 
than offenders who proceed through the normal criminal adjudicative process.  For a small 
sampling of such studies, see National Drug Court Institute, Drug Court Research, 
http://www.ndci.org/research.html (last visited May 28, 2006); see also NOLAN, supra note 37, 
at 128-30; STEVEN BELENKO, THE NATIONAL CENTER ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, RESEARCH ON DRUG COURTS: A CRITICAL REVIEW: 2001 UPDATE 
(2001), available at http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/2001drugcourts.pdf. 
56Press Release, Judicial Council of California, New Report Shows Drug Courts Are Cost-
Effective, Help Rebuild Lives (Apr. 15, 2003), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/ 
presscenter/newsreleases/NR26-03.HTM. 
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to drug-free babies.57  Besides achieving their social goals, drug courts have also 
been found to be cost-effective alternatives to incarceration.58 
B.  Procedural Matters Related to Drug Courts 
Most jurisdictions employ a two-step screening process shortly after arrest to 
determine if an offender is eligible for drug court.59  The first step involves a judicial 
screening to determine if the arrestee meets the eligibility requirements set by the 
court.60  Eligibility criteria include factors such as criminal history, severity of 
chemical dependency, and gravity of the current criminal charge.61  Violent or repeat 
offenders and high-level traffickers are routinely excluded from drug courts.62  Other 
precluding factors include gang membership, multiple concurrent charges, additional 
pending cases, and out-of-county residence.63  The second part of the screening 
process involves a clinical assessment to determine if the arrestee actually has an 
addiction or substance abuse problem that is likely to benefit from treatment.64   
Once an offender passes both steps and confirms his or her desire to enter the 
drug court docket, a written plan is drawn up with input from the judge, prosecutor, 
defense attorney, and other drug court personnel.65  Typical agreements include 
numerous stipulations.66  Among other things, the defendant usually must agree to 
submit to any rehabilitative treatment program as directed by the court.67   
                                                                
57Id. 
58Id.  The California study discussed in this press release revealed that criminal justice 
costs that were avoided averaged approximately $200,000 annually per court for each 100 
participants.  Id.  Based on this data, with ninety adult drug courts operating statewide as of 
2002 and an estimated 100 participants in each court annually, adult drug courts may be 
saving up to $18 million every year in California’s criminal justice system alone.  Id.  
Notwithstanding the movement’s apparent success, drug courts do have their detractors: “Drug 
courts are just the latest Band-AidTM we have tried to apply over the deep wound of our 
schizophrenia about drugs,” says Denver, Colorado Judge Morris B. Hoffman; “Drug courts 
themselves have become a kind of institutional narcotic upon which the entire criminal justice 
system is becoming increasingly dependent.”  Morris B. Hoffman, Commentary, The Drug 
Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1441, 1533 (2000). 
59Gallas, supra note 33, at 1070. 
60Id. 
61Id. 
62John Feinblatt, Greg Berman, & Aubrey Fox, Institutionalizing Innovation: The New 
York Drug Court Story, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277, 283 (2000). 
63NOLAN, supra note 37, at 41. 
64Gallas, supra note 33, at 1070-71. 
65Candace McCoy, The Politics of Problem-Solving: An Overview of the Origins and 
Development of Therapeutic Courts, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1513, 1515 (2003).  Typically 
these personnel involve professionals who work in the substance abuse treatment field.  Id. 
66Lisa Rosenblum, Mandating Effective Treatment for Drug Offenders, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 
1217, 1220 (2002); NOLAN, supra note 37, at 199.  To view one such agreement, visit the web 
page of retired State of California Superior Court Judge Peggy Fulton Hora, 
http://www.judgehora.com/contract.html (last visited May 28, 2006).  Judge Hora is a 
prominent figure in the drug court movement.  Another agreement is available on Sebastian 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
680 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:671 
Both outpatient and residential treatment services are available to the courts.68  
Over half of drug courts contract for treatment services with local community-based 
or private treatment organizations.69  Another fourteen percent use county health 
departments for treatment purposes.70  Approximately twenty percent of drug courts 
have obtained some form of supplementary private funding toward this end.71  Courts 
most often employ residential treatment facilities when offenders repeatedly fail to 
meet their responsibilities and obligations under the drug court agreement (e.g., 
multiple positive urinalysis screens).72  Residential treatment programs typically last 
anywhere from three months to one year.73   
                                                          
County, Arkansas’s web page, Sebastian County Online, http://www.sebastiancountyonline. 
com/sebhome.nsf/25438994ffb303d688256b1a00669191/$FILE/Terms.pdf (last visited May 
28, 2006).  Of particular interest is condition #17: 
The Defendant understands that he will not change, engage in, or pursue any new 
romantic or sexual relationship, romantically fraternize with any person in or outside 
of Drug Court, for a period of one year or longer, or upon completion of Drug Court 
mandated treatment care, whichever may come first. 
Id.  This proviso has its basis in twelve-step conventional wisdom that it is inadvisable to 
engage in intimate relationships during the first year of sobriety (or to make any significant 
life changes, for that matter—so, yes, there are “exceptions” for married newcomers, or for 
those already in committed relationships).  A commonly heard gag around the “rooms of 
A.A.” is that “you can have all the sex you want during the first year of sobriety.  After that, a 
partner can join in.”  While your author has observed that this is generally sound advice, such 
a government-promulgated stipulation raises obvious constitutional (i.e., freedom of 
association) concerns regarding the permissible reach of drug courts. 
67Rosenblum, supra note 66, at 1234-35. 
68John S. Goldkamp, The Drug Court Response: Issues and Implications for Justice 
Change, 63 ALB. L. REV. 923, 935 (2000); PAUL M. ROMAN ET AL., NATIONAL TREATMENT 
CENTER STUDY SUMMARY REPORT: PUBLIC TREATMENT CENTERS 12 (2004), available at 
http://www.uga.edu/ntcs/PB%20W4%20Summary%20Report.pdf (“A comprehensive report 
detailing the findings of the first wave of on-site interviews with a nationally representative 
sample of publicly funded drug and alcohol treatment programs participating in the National 
Treatment Center Study conducted by the Institute for Behavioral Research, University of 
Georgia.”). 
69NOLAN, supra note 37, at 41. 
70Id. 
71Id. at 97.  A number of judges have engaged in private fundraising to benefit their drug 
courts.  This has raised the eyebrows of some observers who question the propriety of 
privately funding such a basic governmental function as the judicial process.  Id. 
72Rosenblum, supra note 66, at 1226-27.  Other commonly imposed sanctions for not 
following the drug court treatment plan include the following: mandated increased 
participation in twelve-step groups, community service, a day or two of sitting in the jury box 
during drug court sessions, or short stints in the county jail (usually lasting several days to two 
weeks).  NOLAN, supra note 37, at 40; Interview with Jesslyn Wilson, supra note 34.  The first 
raises constitutional issues.  See cases cited supra note 29. 
73Office of National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, Types of 
Treatment, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/treat/treatment.html (last visited May 28, 
2006).  Some programs are as short as one month, see, e.g., The Right Step, Treatment 
Customized for You, http://www.rightstep.com/index.php/programs/alcohol-treatment (last 
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C.  Day-to-Day Life at a Modern Substance Abuse Treatment Center 
While it is impossible to generalize about the “average” experience inside a 
treatment center, some practices are prevalent enough to allow for discussion.74  
Early rising times and morning prayer or meditative readings are common.75  
Residents are typically required to either attend school or secure employment soon 
after taking up residence.76  Twelve-step meeting quotas (usually between three and 
five per week) are enforced.77  Center staff hold weekly individual counseling 
sessions and bi-weekly group meetings to discuss residents’ progress.78  Isolation in 
one’s room is frowned upon, if not explicitly forbidden.79   
Strict rules and regulations are the norm,80 and residents are monitored closely 
and held accountable for their actions.81  Questioning of, or resistance to, any of the 
                                                          
visited May 28, 2006), while others last as long as two years, see, e.g., Cenikor, Recovery 
Services, http://www.cenikor.org/content.aspx?cat=treatment&page=treatment (last visited 
May 28, 2006).   
74Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; 
Interview with Preston W. Elder, supra note 31; see generally PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 
38-43.  For an example of one treatment center’s handbook, including its rules, see TEEN 
RANCH, PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL CARE YOUTH AND PARENT HANDBOOK (2004), available at 
http://www.teenranch.com/youth_handbook.pdf.  Teen Ranch was involved in a 2005 lawsuit 
primarily because it incorporated religious practices into its treatment approach.  See 
discussion infra Part IV; see also sources cited, supra notes 31, 73 (treatment center web 
pages). 
75Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; 
Interview with Preston W. Elder, supra note 31; see also PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 40. 
76Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; 
Interview with Preston W. Elder, supra note 31.  Many treatment centers require residents 
without high school diplomas to earn a G.E.D.  Id. 
77Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; 
Interview with Preston W. Elder, supra note 31; see also PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 39-
42; ROMAN ET AL., supra note 68, at 21.  In this study, more than 64% of publicly funded 
substance abuse treatment centers reported that attendance at twelve-step meetings during the 
course of treatment is a requirement.  Id. 
78Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; 
Interview with Preston W. Elder, supra note 31; see also PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 39-40 
& n.9.  These “house meetings” are often of a confrontational nature.  Author’s personal 
observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; see also PEELE ET AL., supra note 
39, at 40 n.9. 
79Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; 
Interview with Preston W. Elder, supra note 31; see also PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 40. 
80Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; 
Interview with Preston W. Elder, supra note 31; see generally PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 
38-43. 
81Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; 
Interview with Preston W. Elder, supra note 31; see also PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 40-
41. 
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
682 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:671 
established rules leads to sanctions.82  These rules are often arbitrary and are imposed 
to break entrenched patterns of thinking.83  Every resident is expected to be at all 
meals exactly on time and to actively participate in all scheduled events.84  
Telephone contact with the outside world is limited.85   
At many facilities, most groups, meetings, lectures, and meals begin and end with 
prayer.86  A.A. or Narcotics Anonymous (N.A.)87 members often visit and speak 
                                                                
82Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; 
Interview with Preston W. Elder, supra note 31; see also PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 40.  
Punishments might include having to wake up a half-hour earlier than normal (e.g., 6:00 a.m. 
instead of 6:30 a.m.), being assigned an unpopular cleaning duty, writing a lengthy paper, 
waiting to serve oneself food until the rest of the residents have received their meals, having 
one’s telephone privileges revoked or restricted, being forced to remain silent for a day or 
more, and being prohibited from attending twelve-step meetings.  Author’s personal 
observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; Interview with Preston W. Elder, 
supra note 31; see also PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 40.  The last sanction is particularly 
troubling to your author.  For most treatment center residents, twelve-step meeting attendance 
is not a privilege, but is instead serious, meaningful therapy.  Meeting attendance should not 
be withheld under any circumstances. 
83Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; see also 
PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 40.  For example, St. Christopher’s Halfway House, supra note 
31, enforces the following dietary restrictions on its residents: no caffeine, no sugar, no white 
bread (including pastas), and no potatoes.  The stated rationale is that some alcoholics may 
crave sugars as their bodies adjust to the absence of alcohol or that some addicts may have 
done too much damage to their bodies with drugs to tolerate these foods well.  Amy B. 
Beason, Nutritional Consultant, St. Christopher’s Halfway House, Informal Address to 
Residents (Sept. 2002).  Nonetheless, such restrictions appear arbitrary to residents who do not 
fall into those groups.  One resident was overheard saying, “I came here to learn how to quit 
drinking—not how to eat like a diabetic.”  Author’s personal observations and conversations 
with individuals in recovery.  Another quipped, “I’ve never heard of anybody getting loaded 
off a loaf of Wonder®.”  Id.  Especially during early recovery, one’s thinking is often 
presumed to be “sick.”  For example, a resident who fails to meet his weekly A.A. meeting 
quota, saying he “felt fine,” might be accused of having “stinkin’ thinkin’” or be admonished, 
“That’s your disease talking.”  Author’s personal observations and conversations with 
individuals in recovery; Interview with Preston W. Elder, supra note 31. 
84Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; 
Interview with Preston W. Elder, supra note 31; see also PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 40-
41. 
85Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; 
Interview with Preston W. Elder, supra note 31; see also PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 40. 
86Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; 
Interview with Preston W. Elder, supra note 31; see also PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 40.  
The Serenity prayer and the Lord’s prayer are hallmarks of the recovery field.  Author’s 
personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery. 
87Narcotics Anonymous, http://www.na.org (last visited May 28, 2006).  Other twelve-
step organizations, such as Marijuana Anonymous, http://www.marijuana-anonymous.org (last 
visited May 28, 2006) (M.A.), and Cocaine Anonymous, http://www.ca.org (last visited May 
28, 2006) (C.A.), also exist, as do others.  All are modeled after A.A. 
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about their personal experiences.88  Key personnel positions are frequently held by 
recovering alcoholics or addicts themselves.89  Some are doctors, psychologists, 
nurses, and particularly, so-called substance abuse counselors, the latter possessing 
varying degrees of formal training.90  During the course of the program, a resident 
                                                                
88Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; 
Interview with Preston W. Elder, supra note 31; see also PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 39-
40.  A.A. meetings are sometimes held within the institution itself, and local members and 
“graduates” of the facility often attend.  Staff members are typically forbidden to attend these 
meetings so the residents may share honestly and openly without fear of reprisal.  Author’s 
personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; Interview with Preston 
W. Elder, supra note 31; ROMAN ET AL, supra note 68, at 21.  Twelve-step meetings were held 
on-site at 59.7% of the publicly funded centers in the Roman study.  Id. 
89Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; 
Interview with Preston W. Elder, supra note 31; see also PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 39, 
42; ROMAN ET AL., supra note 68, at 8.  Twelve-step groups do not run treatment centers 
themselves because that would be against their traditions.  A.A. discovered during its 
formative years (1935-1945) that  
certain group attitudes and principles were particularly valuable in assuring survival of 
the informal structure of the Fellowship.  In 1946, . . . these principles were reduced to 
writing by the founders and early members as the Twelve Traditions of Alcoholics 
Anonymous. . . . 
1. Our common welfare should come first; personal recovery depends upon A.A. 
unity. 
2. For our group purpose there is but one ultimate authority—a loving God as He may 
express Himself in our group conscience.  Our leaders are but trusted servants; they do 
not govern. 
3. The only requirement for A.A. membership is a desire to stop drinking. 
4. Each group should be autonomous except in matters affecting other groups or A.A. 
as a whole. 
5. Each group has but one primary purpose—to carry its message to the alcoholic who 
still suffers. 
6. An A.A. group ought never endorse, finance or lend the A.A. name to any related 
facility or outside enterprise, lest problems of money, property and prestige divert us 
from our primary purpose. 
7. Every A.A. group ought to be fully self-supporting, declining outside contributions. 
8. Alcoholics Anonymous should remain forever nonprofessional, but our service 
centers may employ special workers. 
9. A.A., as such, ought never be organized; but we may create service boards or 
committees directly responsible to those they serve. 
10. Alcoholics Anonymous has no opinion on outside issues; hence the A.A. name 
ought never be drawn into public controversy. 
11. Our public relations policy is based on attraction rather than promotion; we need 
always maintain personal anonymity at the level of press, radio and films. 
12. Anonymity is the spiritual foundation of all our traditions, ever reminding us to 
place principles before personalities. 
Alcoholics Anonymous, A.A. Traditions, http://aa.org/en_information_aa.cfm?PageID= 
2&SubPage=52 (last visited May 28, 2006).  “While the Twelve Traditions are not specifically 
binding on any group or groups, an overwhelming majority of members have adopted them as 
the basis for A.A.’s expanding ‘internal’ and public relationships.”  Id. 
90Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; 
Interview with Preston W. Elder, supra note 31; see also PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 39, 
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typically completes the first four to five steps of A.A. or N.A.91  A prevalent 
philosophy is that institutional twelve-step treatment is merely an introduction to 
A.A. or N.A., where the real recovery should take place.92 
Life inside one of these facilities is not easy.93  Nevertheless, many offenders opt 
into these programs as an alternative to prison.94  Some observers have questioned 
whether certain common practices violate residents’ rights.95 
                                                          
42; ROMAN ET AL., supra note 68, at 8.  According to the Roman study, over half (56.8%) of 
counselors at publicly funded treatment centers were certified substance abuse counselors.  Id. 
at 9.  In less than one-quarter of centers (23.9%) were all employed counselors certified, while 
fully 6.8% of centers employed no certified substance abuse counselors.  Id. 
91Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; 
Interview with Preston W. Elder, supra note 31; see also PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 39.  
The twelve steps of A.A. are as follows:  
1. We admitted we were powerless over alcohol—that our lives had become 
unmanageable.  
2. Came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore us to sanity.  
3. Made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of God as we 
understood Him.  
4. Made a searching and fearless moral inventory of ourselves.  
5. Admitted to God, to ourselves, and to another human being the exact nature of our 
wrongs.  
6. Were entirely ready to have God remove all these defects of character.  
7. Humbly asked Him to remove our shortcomings.  
8. Made a list of all persons we had harmed, and became willing to make amends to 
them all.  
9. Made direct amends to such people wherever possible, except when to do so would 
injure them or others.  
10. Continued to take personal inventory and when we were wrong, promptly admitted 
it.  
11. Sought through prayer and meditation to improve our conscious contact with God 
as we understood Him, praying only for knowledge of His will for us and the power to 
carry that out.  
12. Having had a spiritual awakening as the result of these steps, we tried to carry this 
message to alcoholics, and to practice these principles in all our affairs. 
ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS 59-60 (4th ed. 2001) (1939), available at http://www.aa.org/ 
bigbookonline/en_tableofcnt.cfm (follow “5 How It Works” hyperlink) (commonly referred to 
as the “Big Book”).   
92Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; 
Interview with Preston W. Elder, supra note 31; see also PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 38-
43.  A commonly heard clever maxim goes, “Treatment is for discovery; A.A. is for 
recovery.”  Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery. 
93Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; 
Interview with Preston W. Elder, supra note 31; see generally PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 
38-43. 
94Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; see also 
PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 107. 
95See, e.g., PEELE ET AL., supra note 39. 
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III.  ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
A.  Introduction to the “Religion Clauses” 
The first provision of the First Amendment96 has traditionally been split into the 
Establishment97 and Free Exercise98 Clauses for purposes of analysis.  Each clause 
represents a separate guarantee.99  “The Establishment Clause is a restriction on 
government that prevents the founding of a state or national religion, the 
endorsement of any one religion over another, and the preference of religion over 
secularism.”100  It prohibits “pass[ing] laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, 
or prefer one religion over another.”101    
The Free Exercise Clause is “a guarantee of the people's right to practice any 
religion they choose without governmental interference or consequence.”102  It means 
“first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one 
desires.”103  It also prohibits the government from punishing people on the basis of 
their religious views or religious status.104  Furthermore, “religious beliefs need not 
be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First 
Amendment protection.”105 
The two Clauses “are frequently in tension.”106  For example, “some people 
might suggest that providing a military chaplain for troops stationed overseas 
violates the Establishment Clause, while others might suggest that failing to provide 
a chaplain violates the Free Exercise Clause rights of the same troops.”107  The 
                                                                
96
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”  
U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
97
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”  Id.  The 
Establishment Clause was expressly incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment in 1947, 
thereby making it applicable to the states.  Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).  
98
“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. I.  The Free Exercise Clause was expressly incorporated into the Fourteenth 
Amendment, thereby making it applicable to the states.  Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296, 303 (1940). 
99Douglas Roy, Note, Doin' Time in God's House: Why Faith-Based Rehabilitation 
Programs Violate the Establishment Clause, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 795, 806 (2005). 
100Id. 
101Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. 
102ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1200 (2d ed. 
2002). 
103Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-77 (1990). 
104Id. 
105Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). 
106Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004).  
107Doug Linder, Exploring Constitutional Conflicts: Introduction to the Establishment 
Clause, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/estabinto.htm (last visited 
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
686 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:671 
tension stems from a fundamental opposition: the Establishment Clause requires 
governmental neutrality, and the Free Exercise Clause demands that the government 
accommodate some religious practices.108  As Justice Douglas noted in 1961, “The 
reverse side of an ‘establishment’ is a burden on the ‘free exercise’ of religion.”109  
“The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, 
both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical 
extreme, would tend to clash with the other.”110  Yet the Court has long said that 
“there is room for play in the joints” between the two clauses.111  In other words, 
there are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required 
by the Free Exercise Clause.  Governmental funding of faith-based treatment centers 
falls into just such a category.112     
Sometimes, as in Hanas’s case, it can be difficult to discern among all the 
egregious conduct just which of the Clauses is being violated.  In addition to being in 
tension with each other, the two Clauses also overlap at times:113   
Courts and commentators often refer to these as two separate religion 
clauses—nonestablishment and free exercise—and analyze cases as 
falling under one clause or the other.  But other commentators argue that 
the two clauses must be read in light of each other rather than in isolation, 
to harmonize rather than conflict; after all, the clauses were enacted 
simultaneously as a single statement about church and state.114 
Successful Free Exercise claims are rare.115  To run afoul of the Free Exercise 
Clause, government action must rise to such a level that an individual is 
affirmatively prevented from practicing his or her own religion.116  As Justice 
Kennedy observed in a 1993 case, “The principle that government may not enact 
laws that suppress religious belief or practice is so well-understood that few 
violations are recorded in our opinions.”117   
                                                          
May 28, 2006).  In Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 232 (2d Cir. 1985), a federal court of 
appeals ruled that paid military chaplains do not violate the Establishment Clause. 
108See discussion infra Part IV. 
109McGowan v. Maryland., 366 U.S. 420, 578 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
110Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).   
111Id. at 669. 
112See generally Teen Ranch v. Udow, 389 F. Supp. 2d 827 (W.D. Mich. 2005). 
113Perhaps this is why they are so often simply referred to as the “Religion Clauses” in 
tandem or, simply, “First Amendment rights” in case law and scholarly literature. 
114THOMAS C. BERG, THE STATE AND RELIGION IN A NUTSHELL 5-6 (1998). 
115See Supryia M. Ray, Paternalism, Hostility, and Concern for the Slippery Slope: Factors 
in Judicial Decision-Making When Religion and Regulation Collide, 
http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/184/sray.html (last visited May 28, 2006) (Part II. 
Overview). 
116See MARGARET C. JASPER, RELIGION AND THE LAW 3 (1998). 
117Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523 (1993). 
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Thus, those actions attributable to the government that directly interfere with an 
individual’s ability to practice his own religion fall under the Free Exercise Clause.  
Other activities—even those closely related, such as coercion to follow a specific 
religion or religion in general—fall under the Establishment Clause.  Therefore, 
absent the (hopefully) extremely rare conduct displayed in Hanas’s case, most legal 
actions involving mandatory faith-based substance abuse treatment will implicate the 
Establishment Clause as opposed to the Free Exercise Clause.  Furthermore, the vast 
majority of Free Exercise cases deal with questions different, at least in their 
formulation and emphasis, from the issue here.118  Therefore, while it is possible for 
faith-based treatment to violate the Free Exercise Clause in extreme circumstances, 
the balance of this Note will focus on violation of the Establishment Clause in these 
situations. 
B.  Modern Establishment Clause Jurisprudence 
Since the Supreme Court began modern Establishment Clause interpretation back 
in 1947 with Everson v. Board of Education,119 four different and (at times) 
conflicting views regarding the Establishment Clause have emerged: (1) separation, 
(2) coercion, (3) endorsement, and (4) neutrality.120  Tests unique to each of these 
views have also developed.121  Each of the approaches reflect different values 
regarding the relationship between church and state.  The Court continues to waver 
between these different values.  For a number of years, it gave primary attention to 
separation; but more recently, it has emphasized equality and choice more frequently 
in accordance with the neutrality test.122  Despite this trend toward neutrality, 
however, Establishment Clause jurisprudence ultimately remains unsettled as 
Justices form shifting majorities around one or another of the four views.123 
1.  Separation 
Some people believe that there should be no relationship at all between religion 
and government and advocate the so-called “wall of separation” between church and 
state.  This “separationist” view developed directly from Everson124 and has evolved 
into what is today commonly referred to as the Lemon/Agostini test.  The 
Lemon/Agostini test was first expressed in three parts as the Lemon test in 1973 in 
                                                                
118See generally Thomas Berg, Free Exercise of Religion, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 307 (Edwin Meese III et al. eds., 2005). 
119Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).   
120See generally John Baker, Establishment of Religion, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 118, at 302; see also First Amendment Center, Religious Liberty in 
Public Life: Establishment Clause, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/rel_liberty/ 
establishment/index.aspx (last visited May 28, 2006). 
121See generally Baker, supra note 120; see also First Amendment Center, supra note 120.  
122BERG, supra note 114, at 158. 
123Baker, supra note 120, at 306. 
124Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.  “In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of 
religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and state.’”  Id. 
(quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)).  
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Lemon v. Kurtzman,125 and modified to a two-pronged inquiry articulated in Agostini 
v. Felton126 in 1997.  The Lemon/Agostini test asks whether (1) the state action was 
undertaken with the intent of impacting religion and (2) whether the primary effect 
of the state action is to advance or inhibit religion.127   
To determine whether a primary effect of the state action advances or inhibits 
religion, courts examine three factors: (1) the presence of religious indoctrination 
attributable to the government, (2) the definition of government aid recipients by 
reference to religion, and (3) the creation of excessive entanglement between 
government and religion.128  The Supreme Court has recently departed somewhat 
from its reliance upon the Lemon/Agostini test.129  Nevertheless, it remains at the 
forefront of Establishment Clause analysis in lower courts130 and has been used to 
analyze the recent cases on treatment centers that will be examined in the next 
section. 
Several Justices, as well as many legal commentators, became dissatisfied with 
this test.131  Among other things, the test was seen as hostile to religious exercise and 
to historic traditions of religious involvement in public life.132  While the Court has 
not officially rejected the test, it has increasingly looked to alternatives.133 
2.  Coercion 
While some groups want strict separation between church and state, others feel 
government should be more accommodating to religion.  If the first group is referred 
to as “separationists,” the latter may be called “accomodationists.”134  
Accomodationists believe a “wall of separation” “is neither practical nor 
desirable.”135  With the Establishment Clause, “total separation is not possible in an 
absolute sense.  Some relationship between government and religious organizations 
is inevitable.  [T]he line of separation, far from being a ‘wall,’ is a blurred, indistinct, 
and variable barrier depending upon all the circumstances of a particular 
                                                                
125Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973). 
126Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
127Id.; see also Dehn, supra note 29, at 287. 
128Agostini, 521 U.S. at 218. 
129Baker, supra note 120, at 304.  “A major historical challenge to the separationist 
position emerged in the dissent written by (then) Justice William H. Rehnquist in Wallace v. 
Jaffree in 1985.  Rehnquist argued that the original meaning of the Establishment of Religion 
Clause only ‘forbade establishment of a national religion, and forbade preference among 
religious sects or denominations.’”  Id. (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985)). 
130See discussion infra Part IV. 
131BERG, supra note 114, at 29. 
132Id. at 29-30. 
133See discussion infra Part IV. 
134KATHIANN M. KOWALSKI, LEMON V. KURTZMAN AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND 
STATE DEBATE 91 (2005); see also Baker, supra note 120, at 305. 
135KOWALSKI, supra note 134, at 45. 
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relationship.”136  The “wall of separation” metaphor “is not a wholly accurate 
description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between 
church and state.”137 
Accomodationists propose allowing more government support for religion than 
the Lemon/Agostini test allows.  They support the adoption of the “coercion test” 
outlined by Justice Anthony Kennedy in his dissent in County of Allegheny v. 
ACLU.138  Under this test, the government does not violate the Establishment Clause 
unless it (1) provides direct aid to religion in a way that would tend to establish a 
state church or (2) coerces people to support or participate in religion against their 
will.139  Justice Scalia is a chief proponent of the coercion test, and has argued that 
the Establishment Clause should be limited to coercion “by force of law [or] threat of 
penalty.”140  Early cases using this test focused on the critical distinction between 
“direct” and “indirect” aid and what constitutes each.141  More recent cases have 
recognized that all governmental aid is in some way fungible (i.e., if a religious 
school receives free math texts from the state, then the money the school would have 
spent on secular texts can now be spent on religious material).142  This realization 
refocused the Court’s attention on who received and controlled the aid, versus the 
specific type of aid that was provided.143  Courts also examined whether the aid was 
the result of a “true, private choice” of the beneficiary (for purposes of this Note, a 
criminal offender sentenced to treatment).144  If a beneficiary freely chose a faith-
based treatment center at which to serve his sentence, that independent choice 
effectively acted as a “circuit breaker” between the funds and the government, since 
any indoctrination would not be attributed to the state, but rather, to the individual’s 
election to attend that particular facility.145  Thus, the beneficiary’s choice achieved a 
greater symbolic separation between church and state by interposing the action of a 
private citizen. 
The Seventh Circuit developed its own coercion test in 1996 in Kerr v. Farrey,146 
where a prison inmate was required to participate specifically in N.A. to gain parole 
eligibility.  The court propounded a simple three-part inquiry: (1) Has the state acted, 
                                                                
136Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (citation omitted); see also N.Y. State 
Employment Relations Bd. v. Christ the King Reg’l High Sch., 682 N.E.2d 960, 965 (N.Y. 
1997). 
137KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1583 (15th ed. 
2004). 
138County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
139First Amendment Center, supra note 120. 
140Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
141See discussion infra Part IV. 
142First Amendment Center, supra note 120.  
143Id. 
144See discussion infra Part IV. 
145See, e.g., Teen Ranch v. Udow, 389 F. Supp. 2d 827, 834 (W.D. Mich. 2005).   
146Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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(2) Does the action amount to coercion, (3) If so, is the object of the coercion 
religious or secular?147  Courts usually infer coercion where a defendant is required 
to choose between incarceration or loss of privilege and participation in twelve-step 
groups.148  In effect, the inherent negative consequences of refusing to participate in 
the twelve-step group eliminates the presence of “true, private choice.”149 
Aside from lingering separationist hostility to the coercion test, opponents of the 
test argue that to limit the Establishment Clause to cases of coercion would render 
the Clause redundant, since the Free Exercise Clause already prohibits government 
from forcing anyone to practice or not practice a religion.150  Nevertheless, the 
coercion test has gained support from several justices151 and has been used in a 
variety of contexts in recent cases.152  Moreover, if courts are more likely to consider 
challenges under the Establishment Clause, the coercion test analysis offers another 
way to protect the Free Exercise rights of defendants referred to treatment centers. 
3.  Endorsement 
The Supreme Court has made clear since its 1947 decision in Everson v. Board of 
Education153 that the First Amendment requires that the state be neutral in its 
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers.154  This philosophy is 
reflected in Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s endorsement test.   
Government cannot favor certain religions over others.155  Reflective of this 
policy, Justice O’Connor developed the endorsement test as an alternative to both the 
strict separationist view (usually represented by the Lemon/Agostini test), and the 
“no coercion” principle (reflected in the coercion test).156  The endorsement test 
forbids government from sending a message that religious beliefs are endorsed or 
                                                                
147Id. at 479. 
148Dehn, supra note 29, at 291. 
149Id. 
150BERG, supra note 114, at 33.  This is one example of how the two Clauses can overlap; 
apparently, coercing someone to follow a specific religion, or religion in general, can fall 
under either of the two Clauses. 
151Justices using the coercion test in their opinions—or who have joined such opinions—
include Scalia, Kennedy, Blackmun, White, Stevens, and O’Connor.  See Lee v. Weisman, 
505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989).  
Different results have been reached by different justices when applying the test, however.  See, 
e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 599.  Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and O’Connor expressed in their Lee 
concurrence that, although proof of government coercion is sufficient to prove a violation of 
the Establishment Clause, government endorsement or sponsorship of religion and the 
government’s active involvement in religion are similarly prohibited, regardless of whether 
citizens are coerced to conform.  Id. 
152See cases cited supra note 29; see also discussion infra Part IV. 
153Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
154Id. at 18. 
155McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2742 (2005).  
156Baker, supra note 120, at 305. 
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opposed by the government and asks whether an objective, reasonable observer 
would see the state action as sending “a message to nonadherents that they are . . . 
not full members of the political community.”157 
O’Connor’s endorsement test has increasingly been subsumed into the 
Lemon/Agostini test in the lower courts.158  Judges have simply incorporated it into 
the first two prongs of Lemon/Agostini by asking if the challenged government act 
has the purpose or effect of advancing or endorsing religion.159  The endorsement 
test is most often invoked in situations where the government is engaged in 
expressive activities.160  Therefore, cases involving such issues as graduation prayers, 
religious displays on government property, and religion in the curriculum will 
usually be examined in light of this test.161  However, the endorsement test has also 
been used, in addition to the Lemon/Agostini and coercion tests, in faith-based 
treatment facility cases.162  
4.  Neutrality 
Finally, recent Establishment Clause decisions have increasingly focused on a 
test of “neutrality.”  This test has been especially visible in decisions upholding 
various forms of government aid provided to religious organizations as long as such 
aid is provided equally to comparable organizations.163  Sometimes the interests of 
government and those of religious groups incidentally coincide.  Such is the case 
with religiously run hospitals, childcare centers, homeless shelters, schools, and 
addiction treatment centers.  Justice Brennan observed back in 1987 that what the 
government characterizes as social services, religious organizations view as the 
fulfillment of duty, as service in grateful response to unmerited favor, as good works 
that give definition and focus to the community, and as a visible witness and 
example to society.164 
Although neutrality was noted as a guiding principle in Everson, it takes on a 
different meaning in the modern neutrality test.  Today, neutrality means 
evenhandedness in terms of who may receive aid.165  Under this test, the government 
must treat religious groups the same as other similarly situated groups:  
[I]n commanding neutrality, the Religion Clauses do not require the 
government to be oblivious to impositions that legitimate exercises of 
state power may place on religious belief and practice.  Rather, there is 
                                                                
157Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
158See cases cited supra note 29; see also discussion infra Part IV. 
159See cases cited supra note 29; see also discussion infra Part IV. 
160First Amendment Center, supra note 120. 
161Id. 
162See discussion infra Part IV. 
163BERG, supra note 114, at 34. 
164See Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342-44 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
165See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 696 (2002).   
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“ample room under the Establishment Clause for ‘benevolent neutrality 
which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and 
without interference.’”166 
In 1996, Congress adopted this philosophy by enacting Charitable Choice.167 
a.  Charitable Choice and Faith-Based Substance Abuse Treatment Centers 
Charitable Choice began its role in federal law as part of a welfare reform act, 
and it was expanded to include substance abuse treatment in 2000.168  The provision 
allows religious groups access to federal funds without having to establish a secular 
service-provider component.169  Charitable Choice also allows religious groups to 
incorporate their religious messages into programs and to consider applicants’ 
religion in hiring practices.170   
Charitable Choice encourages states to involve community and faith-based 
organizations in providing federally funded services.  With respect to treatment 
centers, Charitable Choice makes it possible for the government to contract with both 
religious and secular providers, as long as those providers offer effective help and 
follow certain rules about accountability and respect for clients: 
Although religious organizations have been eligible to receive government 
aid under certain government programs for many years, [C]haritable 
[C]hoice is unique in that it does not require participating faith-based 
organizations to “secularize” themselves as a condition to receiving public 
funds. To the contrary, the [C]haritable [C]hoice statute allows publicly 
funded religious organizations to retain their religious character and to 
employ their religious faith in carrying out secular social service 
programs, as long as the programs are administered in conformance with 
the [E]stablishment [C]lause of the First Amendment.171 
The legislative provisions contain explicit requirements: providers cannot 
discriminate against recipients on the basis of their religion or lack thereof; providers 
cannot force recipients to take part in religious activities such as worship, prayer, or 
                                                                
166Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994) (quoting Amos, 483 U.S. at 334). 
167Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 104, 42 
U.S.C. § 604a (2006).  Even prior to Charitable Choice, billions of governmental funds were 
spent on social services delivered through religious providers through contracts and grants.  
Hearing, supra note 25, at 9-10, 40-41 (prepared statements of Mr. Carl H. Esbeck, Senior 
Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, and Ira C. 
Lupo, Louis Harkey Mayo Research Professor of Law, The George Washington University 
School of Law).  
168See 42 U.S.C. §§ 290kk to kk-3 (2006).  
169The Center for Public Justice, A Guide to Charitable Choice: Questions and Answers, 
http://www.cpjustice.org/charitablechoice/guide/qanda (last visited May 28, 2006). 
170Id. 
171Freedom from Religion Found. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950, 982 (W.D. Wis. 
2002), judgment as a matter of law granted by 214 F. Supp. 2d 905 (W.D. Wis. 2002), aff’d, 
324 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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Bible study; and the government must be prepared to offer a secular alternative if a 
recipient does not want to receive services from a religious provider.172  Charitable 
Choice has greatly expanded the breadth of service providers with which the 
government may contract.173  The program has also relieved, to some extent, the 
degree of monitoring of providers required by the government, thereby effectively 
eliminating the risk of government’s becoming “excessively entangled” in religious 
matters under the Lemon/Agostini test.174  Government’s primary concern (and the 
concern of taxpayers) is that the services be effective, that full secular value for the 
funding is realized, and that the rights of recipients be protected.175  
C.  Summary of Advanced Establishment Clause Jurisprudence 
Although the Supreme Court has struggled for more than a century to translate 
the few words comprising the Establishment Clause into concrete rules and doctrine, 
courts have “found [themselves] ‘compelled’ by ‘candor’ to ‘acknowledge[] that [it] 
can only dimly perceive the boundaries of permissible government activity in this 
sensitive area.’”176  The values reflected in each of the four approaches discussed 
above often clash, at least if each is pursued to its logical conclusion.177  However, 
lower courts have successfully applied each test to various recent faith-based 
treatment decisions.178  
IV.  THE TESTS AT WORK: FAITH-BASED TREATMENT CENTER CASE LAW 
Establishment Clause cases dealing with treatment centers can be divided into 
two broad categories.179  In the first group are those cases alleging government 
efforts to coerce someone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.180  In 
these cases, “the essence of the complaint is that the state is somehow forcing a 
person who does not subscribe to the religious tenets at issue to support them or to 
participate in observing them.”181  These cases are sometimes referred to as the 
                                                                
172See 42 U.S.C. §§ 290kk to kk-3. 
173See generally Carl H. Esbeck, Charitable Choice and the Critics, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 17 (2000). 
174Most notably, government is no longer obligated to ensure that treatment center 
administrators are only spending the funds on approved (i.e., purely secular) activities.  
Because the degree of administrative oversight required is diminished to such a substantial 
extent, one would be hard-pressed to envision a Charitable-Choice-compliant facility that 
would fail the excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon/Agostini test.  
175See 42 U.S.C. §§ 290kk to kk-3; 42 C.F.R. §§ 54.1-.13, 54a.1-.13 (2006).  
176Destefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 405 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807 (1971) (plurality opinion) (second and third alterations 
in original). 
177BERG, supra note 114, at 22. 
178See discussion infra Part IV. 
179Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 1996). 
180Id. 
181Id. 
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“outsider” cases, where the state is imposing religion on an unwilling individual as 
an “outsider.”182  The second group of cases has inspired more controversy within the 
Supreme Court.183  “These are the cases in which existing religious groups seek some 
benefit from the state, or in which the state wishes to confer a benefit on such a 
group (or groups).”184  These are sometimes referred to as the “insider” cases, and 
they deal with how far the state may go in helping religious “insiders.”185  While 
most cases fall neatly into one or the other of these two categories, cases dealing 
with mandatory faith-based substance abuse treatment fall into both when the 
offender objects to the sentence on religious grounds.  Consequently, two legal 
questions are raised simultaneously: (1) May the state place an offender into a faith-
based facility in the first place, and (2) May the government fund that same facility?  
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to “plunge into the thicket”186 of 
Establishment Clause case law in this area.  When we emerge, we find that “yes” is 
the answer to the second question; “yes, but…” to the first. 
Most cases in the substance abuse rehabilitation arena have addressed the 
constitutionality of court-mandated attendance at twelve-step meetings.187  Although 
related in many important respects, cases dealing with governmentally funded faith-
based treatment centers are fundamentally different from those cases.  Twelve-step 
groups receive no governmental monetary support (and would refuse it, even if it 
were offered).188  In contrast, the residential treatment facilities in these cases do 
receive such aid, either by federal or local government funding or through both 
mechanisms.189  To date, the application of the indoctrination question contained in 
the “purpose and effect” prong of the Lemon/Agostini test has been reserved for 
instances where the state actually provides direct or indirect financial support to a 
religious organization that is furthering a permissible public objective.190  A few 
                                                                
182Id. 
183Id. 
184Id. 
185Id.   
186Destefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 402 (2d Cir. 2001). 
187See cases cited supra note 29. 
188In fact, A.A. adheres to a strict policy of refusing donations from all but its members 
pursuant to its Seventh Tradition.  See supra note 89.  Attempted donations from nonmembers 
are politely returned with an explanation.  Conversely, A.A. makes no donations to any 
outside organization or cause, “no matter how worthy.”  A.A. GUIDELINES: FINANCE (2005), 
available at http://aa.org/en_pdfs/mg-15_finance.pdf.  Even member contributions are capped 
at an annual amount.  For years, the maximum allowable donation was $1000, but that limit 
was recently doubled.  The vast majority of members, however, come nowhere close to 
contributing this amount.  Most devout A.A.s (as they are called) usually only put a dollar or 
two in the basket passed around at meetings.  Id.; author’s personal observations and 
conversations with individuals in recovery.   Members usually attend an average of two A.A. 
meetings per week.  ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, 2004 MEMBERSHIP SURVEY (2005), available 
at http://aa.org/en_pdfs/p-48_04survey.pdf.   
189ROMAN ET AL., supra note 68, at 27.  
190Dehn, supra note 29, at 293. 
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cases have dealt specifically with the issue of faith-based treatment centers and the 
Establishment Clause.  Except for Hanas’s case, however, all of them have been civil 
rights lawsuits.191  
A.  Bausch v. Sumiec (2001)192 
Bausch was the first Establishment Clause case to address substance abuse 
treatment centers, as opposed to court-mandated twelve-step meeting attendance.  
Relying on those recent twelve-step meeting attendance cases,193 District Judge 
Adelman held that the state may “condition parole on participation in a religiously-
oriented treatment alternative to revocation only if the religiously-oriented 
alternative is not ‘the only choice available.’”194  In other words, offenders may 
attend a religiously oriented treatment program if they so choose, but the state cannot 
compel it, and a meaningful195 non-religious alternative must be offered regardless of 
whether the offender specifically requests it. 
John Bausch was a former Wisconsin prisoner and parolee.196  He brought this 
civil rights lawsuit against his former parole officer and the Wisconsin Department 
of Corrections alleging violations of the Establishment Clause by their compelling 
his participation in a religiously oriented substance abuse residential treatment 
program (Exodus House197).198  Bausch stated in an affidavit that he was an atheist 
and had objections to the religious nature of Exodus House, but he nevertheless 
participated in the program, believing it was the only way he could avoid having his 
parole revoked.199  
Judge Adelman applied a barrage of tests to the facts, including the original 
Lemon test,200 Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test,201 and the Seventh Circuit’s 
                                                                
191Every one of the cases discussed in this section (save Hanas’s) were filed under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (various editions of the code).  Judging by Hanas’s progress through the 
courts, his case may well become a civil rights suit at some point in the near future. 
192Bausch v. Sumiec, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1029  (E.D. Wis.  2001).  
193See cases cited supra note 29. 
194Bausch, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 1033 (quoting Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 480 (7th Cir. 
1996).  
195That is, more than “available in name only.”  Id. 
196Id. at 1031. 
197Exodus House Transitional Care Facility, http://www.hnet.net/good/charity/exodus.htm 
(last visited May 28, 2006).  Although not evident from its web site, “The Exodus House 
program is based on the principles of [A.A. and N.A.] and has a substantial religious 
component.”  Bausch, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 1031.  It is unclear from the opinion or the website 
whether Exodus House received then or receives today any governmental aid aside from the 
support provided by court referrals.   
198Bausch, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 1031. 
199Id. 
200Id. at 1035.  This author can only surmise that Judge Adelman (or her clerk) was 
unaware that the Lemon test had since been refined to the two-pronged Lemon/Agostini 
inquiry. 
201Bausch, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.   
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coercion test.202  Drawing many similarities between Bausch’s case and recent 
twelve-step sentencing cases,203 Judge Adelman found that the State failed all three 
tests.204  Wisconsin’s assertion that Bausch needed only to have requested a secular 
alternative was swiftly rejected:  “[I]t is government’s obligation always to comply 
with the Constitution, rather than to do so only upon request.”205 
B.  Destefano v. Emergency Housing Group (2001)206 
Less than two weeks after Judge Adelman handed down her decision in 
Bausch,207 Judge Sack ruled in the second Establishment Clause treatment center 
case, Destefano.  Writing for the Second Circuit, Judge Sack held that involvement 
of A.A. as part of a state-funded treatment approach is “not in itself constitutionally 
impermissible”;208 indeed, even “strong, urging, and active encouragement”209 of 
clients’ participation in A.A. by the facility’s staff did not run afoul of the 
Establishment Clause.210  Direct staff participation in indoctrinating clients with A.A. 
views was, however, unconstitutional.211 
Joseph M. Destefano was the mayor of Middletown, New York.212  He brought 
this civil rights lawsuit against state defendants and a treatment facility (the 
Middletown Alcohol Crisis Center (MACC), one of four different programs the 
Emergency Housing Group operated), claiming that allocation of state tax revenues 
to a private alcoholic treatment facility that included A.A. in its program violated the 
Establishment Clause.213 
Destefano was unique in that neither courts, state employees, nor agencies sent 
offenders to the facility.214  Instead, clients would simply walk in “off the street,” so 
to speak.215  All clients were at the MACC of their own volition and could leave at 
                                                                
202Id. at 1033. 
203See cases cited supra note 29. 
204Bausch, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-37. 
205Id. at 1035.  Judge Adelman was particularly persuaded by Derek Apanovich’s 
argument suggesting that few defendants would be brazen enough to assert their rights while 
under criminal justice supervision, and thus, most individuals would either just resign 
themselves to the court’s order or assume that they have no choice other than compliance.  Id.; 
see also Apanovich, supra note 40, at 850. 
206Destefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397 (2d Cir. 2001). 
207Bausch, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1029, was decided on April 10, 2001.  Destefano, 247 F.3d 
397 was decided ten days later on April 20, 2001. 
208Destefano, 247 F.3d at 410. 
209Id. 
210Id.  
211Id. 
212Id. at 401. 
213Id.  
214Id. at 402. 
215Id. 
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any time.216  Clients were not compelled to attend the A.A. meetings held within the 
facility, although they were encouraged to do so by MACC staff.217  The Center 
operated primarily as a “non-medical, short-term alcohol detoxification and 
treatment facility,”218 and provided its clients with “supervision during the sobering-
up phase, alcoholism counseling, rap groups,219 educational films, participation in 
A.A., recreational activities, meals, and assessments and referrals for continuing 
treatment.”220  Although it was undisputed that A.A. and its twelve-step program 
played a central role in the MACC’s overall treatment approach, the precise nature of 
this role was unclear.221 
At the time of this case, the United States Supreme Court had no precedent for 
the use of public funds to finance religious activities, at least not in situations 
analogous to this one, where the Center’s clients chose to participate in such 
activities.222  As such, the court noted that state funding of a clinic that encourages 
people to engage in religious activities “falls within the zone of constitutionally 
questionable and unresolved conduct.”223  Applying the Lemon/Agostini/endorsement 
test, Judge Sack affirmed most of the New York Southern District’s decision, 
holding that there was no constitutional problem as long as the facility’s staff did not 
coerce clients to attend A.A. sessions and as long as staff did not themselves directly 
indoctrinate clients with A.A. principles.224  Allegations were also made that staff 
engaged in nightly readings of A.A. literature, discussion of A.A. at the facility’s 
events, and played videotapes that focused on the twelve steps.225  Regarding these 
types of activities, the court held that “[d]irect state funding of persons who actively 
inculcate religious beliefs crosses the vague but palpable line between permissible 
and impermissible government action under the [Establishment Clause].”226  
                                                                
216Id. 
217Id. at 403. 
218Id. at 402. 
219This presumably means discussion groups, as opposed to visiting hip-hop posses 
entertaining the clients. 
220Id. at 402.  Such facilities are rare today.  They are commonly referred to as “drying-out 
places” in A.A. parlance and literature. 
221Id. at 402-03. 
222Id. at 419. 
223Id. at 411. 
224Id. at 410, 416. 
225Id. at 403.  “In one such program entitled ‘The Twelve Steps of Alcoholics 
Anonymous,’ a priest named Father Martin stands before an assemblage of people and advises 
them that ‘the prayer of the drunk is the prayer of a soul in pain, and those are the souls that 
God loves best.’”  Id. at 419.  Father Martin is a well-known figure within the substance abuse 
treatment and recovery field.  If someone mentions “Father Martin tapes” in an A.A. meeting, 
most people will understand the reference.  In his videos, he essentially mixes education about 
the disease with spirituality.  Your author has screened all of his films and gives them two 
enthusiastic thumbs up. 
226Id. at 408.  The court relied heavily on Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) 
(authorizing federal grants to religious institutions is not inherently unconstitutional), in 
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C.  Freedom from Religion Found. v. McCallum (2003)227 
McCallum underscored the importance of providing parolees with treatment 
options.  Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner held that it did not violate the 
Establishment Clause for Wisconsin to pay for rehabilitative services at a Christian-
oriented halfway house or for parole officers to recommend that halfway house, 
along with secular options, to parolees.228  Plaintiffs challenged defendants’ use of a 
faith-based rehabilitation program (Faith Works) as an alternative for offenders 
under the supervision of the Department of Corrections.229  Once again, the pertinent 
question was whether offenders who participated in the Faith Works program did so 
of their own independent, private choice.230   
Judge Posner, working under no particular test,231 again distinguished sharply 
between government programs that provide support directly to a religious entity (as 
in Destefano) and those programs that provide benefits to individuals who, in turn, 
choose to confer that benefit on a religious institution.232  Key to Posner’s decision 
was the fact that parole officers took great pains to explain to their parolees that their 
suggestions were just that—non-binding recommendations.233  Further, parolees were 
always informed that Faith Works was a Christian institution and that its program 
had a significant Christian element.234  Finally, Judge Posner declared that “[t]he 
U.S. Supreme Court will not allow a public agency to force religion on people even 
if the agency honestly or even correctly believes that it is the best way of achieving a 
secular end that is within government’s constitutional authority to promote.”235  
D.  Teen Ranch v. Udow (2005)236 
The most recent decision in this arena, Teen Ranch, expertly addressed the issues 
relevant to court-mandated faith-based treatment.  Teen Ranch held that referral of 
troubled teens to a religious residential program violated the Establishment Clause 
even where participants were later given the option of leaving the program and 
selecting another institution, because the initial referral did not allow the choice of a 
                                                          
determining that inclusion of A.A. as one element in the program’s treatment plan was 
permissible.   
227Freedom from Religion Found. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003). 
228Id. at 881-82. 
229Id. at 881. 
230Id. at 883-84. 
231It may have gone without saying; the district court applied the Lemon/Agostini and 
endorsement tests in McCallum.  See Freedom from Religion Found. v. McCallum, 179 F. 
Supp. 2d 950 (W.D. Wis. 2002), judgment as a matter of law granted by 214 F. Supp. 2d 
905 (W.D. Wis. 2002), aff’d, 324 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003). 
232McCallum, 324 F.3d at 882.  
233Id. at 883.  “Suggestion is not a synonym for coercion.”  Id. 
234Id. at 881. 
235Id. at 882. 
236Teen Ranch v. Udow, 389 F. Supp. 2d 827 (W.D. Mich. 2005). 
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secular program.237  Teen Ranch, a non-denominational Christian residential facility 
for “disadvantaged youth,”238 sued the Family Independence Agency (FIA), a 
Michigan state government department responsible for administering the state’s 
public assistance, child, and family welfare programs.239  The agency is particularly 
responsible for providing care and supervision to abused, neglected, and delinquent 
children who have been committed to or placed in the care of the FIA through the 
state courts.240  Teen Ranch was one of the private facilities with which the FIA 
contracted.241  Thus, if a child was adjudicated delinquent in a Michigan juvenile 
court, the judge might place that child with the FIA for care and supervision, and that 
child might end up at Teen Ranch.242  Most of Teen Ranch’s residents were state 
placements.243  Teen Ranch was suing because the FIA had imposed a moratorium on 
further placements at the facility due to the FIA’s concerns over Teen Ranch’s 
incorporation of religious practices into programming there.244  Teen Ranch believed, 
among other things, that the moratorium violated the center’s right to the free 
exercise of religion.245 
The court quickly and correctly noted that this case was essentially about the 
tension between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.246  Specifically, Teen 
Ranch wanted “to be free to exercise its religious faith without interference from the 
State, and the FIA want[ed] to avoid violating the Establishment Clause by 
subsidizing a particular religious viewpoint.”247  Judge Bell began by analyzing the 
facts under the Lemon/Agostini/endorsement test.  He noted that the analysis was 
necessarily guided by a state statute248 prohibiting funds provided directly to 
institutions like Teen Ranch from being “used or expended for any sectarian activity 
                                                                
237Id. at 836. 
238Teen Ranch Inc., http://www.teenranch.com (last visited May 28, 2006).  Interestingly, 
the corporation posted its reaction to the ruling in this case (as well as its own interpretation of 
the applicable law) online.  Teen Ranch Inc., Teen Ranch and the FIA: The Truth, 
http://teenranch.com/teenranch_and_fia.asp (last visited May 28, 2006). 
239Teen Ranch, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 829. 
240Id. 
241Id. 
242See id. 
243Id. at 830.  Because most of Teen Ranch’s residents were state placements, the FIA’s 
moratorium on further referrals had a profound economic impact on the institution.  Id.  
Between the time of the moratorium’s enactment and these legal proceedings, Teen Ranch had 
to close several of its programs and was forced to sell half of its residential facilities.  Id. 
244Id. 
245Id.  
246Id. at 831. 
247Id. 
248See Act effective Sept. 29, 2004, No. 344, § 220(1), 2004 Mich. Pub. Acts 1182, 1192 
(2004). 
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including sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization.”249  A federal Charitable 
Choice statute essentially saying the same thing was also implicated.250  Both these 
statutes make important distinctions between “direct” and “indirect” funding, and the 
court acknowledged that if Teen Ranch’s funding was indirect, then the State was 
not permitted to condition funding on Teen Ranch eliminating its religious 
practices.251  The court recognized, consistent with the discussion in the previous 
section, that “although previous cases had emphasized the distinction between direct 
and indirect aid, more recent cases have addressed the purpose of preventing 
subsidization of religion by focusing on the principle of ‘private choice.’”252  Judge 
Bell pointed out that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly upheld programs against 
Establishment Clause challenges where the state funding of the programs arose out 
of ‘true, private choice’ or the ‘genuine and independent choices of private 
individuals.’”253  In other words, private choice “transforms constitutionally 
troublesome ‘direct’ funding into constitutionally permissible ‘indirect’ funding.”254  
Thus, the real issue in this case was whether being able to “opt-out” after being 
placed at Teen Ranch was “enough of a choice” to render the governmental aid 
indirect rather than direct and thereby avoid offending the Establishment Clause.255   
The Court concluded that this was insufficient.256  First, children were unable to 
choose where they would initially be placed.257  Second, “[r]egardless of whether 
state wards are particularly vulnerable [and thus, presumably too shy or fearful to 
reject placement at Teen Ranch], they are children.”258  Third, and perhaps most 
importantly, all of the preceding cases upholding the importance of private choice 
had involved a variety of options presented to the offender.259  All of these factors 
combined to result in failure of the endorsement test.260 
With regard to Teen Ranch’s Free Exercise claim, the court held that “[u]nlike 
unemployment benefits or the ability to hold office, a state contract for youth 
residential services is not a public benefit.  [T]he State [cannot] be required under the 
                                                                
249Id.  
250See 42 U.S.C. § 604a (2006). 
251Teen Ranch, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 833. 
252Id. at 834 (quoting Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 816 (2000) (plurality opinion)). 
253Id. (quoting Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002)). 
254Id.  
255Id. at 834-35. 
256Id. at 836. 
257Id. at 829, 835. 
258Id. at 835.  The court mentioned that “[t]here are no cases regarding the sufficiency of 
an adult’s ability to opt-out, much less a case about children.” Id. at 836.  Therefore, it is at 
least possible that such a policy might survive scrutiny if adults were involved instead of 
children. 
259Id. at 835.  See, e.g., cases discussed supra Part IV.  
260Id. at 836. 
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Free Exercise Clause to contract with a religious organization.”261  The court 
analogized to the related school funding issue, observing that “‘there is no federal 
constitutional requirement that private schools be permitted to share with public 
schools in state largesse on an equal basis.’”262  Thus, the suit was dismissed in its 
entirety.263 
E.  Hanas v. Genesee County Adult Prob. Dep’t (pending)264 
Although the courts in the previous cases predominantly used the 
Lemon/Agostini/endorsement test, some scholars argue that different tests are 
appropriate for different factual circumstances.  For example, commentator Emily M. 
Gallas has argued that Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test is the correct one to 
apply for drug court cases.265  She points out that by virtue of electing to participate 
in the drug court in the first place, the offender is not, as a practical matter, being 
“coerced” into a treatment center.266  After all, the worst that could happen is that the 
offender would be terminated from the drug court docket and sentenced according to 
the normal adjudicative process.267  Hanas’s lead counsel, American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) attorney Michael Steinberg, disagrees vehemently with this 
argument.  In his view, “An offender may indeed give up some rights upon entering a 
drug court program,268 but such a fundamental right as the freedom of religion is not 
one of them.”269   
The Michigan appellate courts, as well as the United States Supreme Court, may 
have disagreed.  After seven weeks of receiving no drug treatment whatsoever and 
growing weary of Pastor Rottier’s continuing attempts to convert him to the 
Pentecostal faith, Hanas returned to the Drug Court to request reassignment to a 
secular program.270  Judge Ransom responded by removing Hanas from the Drug 
Court docket and sentencing him to six months in either jail or “boot camp” and four 
                                                                
261Id. at 838. 
262Id. at 838 (quoting Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 2004)). 
263Id. at 842. 
264Hanas v. Genesee County Adult Prob. Dep’t, No. 05-CV-74612 (E.D. Mich. filed Dec. 
6, 2005), request to hold case in abeyance granted, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65614 (E.D. Mich. 
Sept. 14, 2006).  
265Gallas, supra note 33, at 1094-95.  
266Id. at 1084-85.     
267That being said, Gallas also insists on secular options being presented alongside faith-
based options.  Id. at 1094-95. 
268Indeed, in many drug court agreements, offenders specifically waive certain 
constitutional rights.  See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
269Telephone interview with Michael J. Steinberg, Legal Director, American Civil 
Liberties Union of Michigan. (Sep. 27, 2005) [hereinafter Interview with Michael J. 
Steinberg].  Gallas’s proposal would also theoretically require having two different standards 
for those sentenced to substance abuse treatment in a regular criminal court and those so 
sentenced in a drug court.  See Gallas, supra note 33.  
270Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 6, at 4. 
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years’ probation.271  The sentencing order also provided that after completion of jail 
or boot camp, Hanas would be released to a secular drug treatment program called 
“New Paths.”272  Judge Ransom left open the possibility that he would consider re-
admitting Hanas back into the Drug Court (and consequently having his plea 
vacated) if he successfully completed jail or boot camp and the first sixty days at 
New Paths.273 
Ultimately, however, despite exemplary records of behavior at both boot camp 
and New Paths, Judge Ransom denied Hanas’s request to re-enter the Drug Court 
docket and have his guilty plea vacated.274  Judge Ransom did note at that hearing, 
nonetheless, that he was no longer making any referrals to Christian Outreach.275  
The ACLU then intervened on Hanas’s behalf, seeking review in the Michigan Court 
of Appeals, alleging violations of both the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses.276  According to the ACLU, Hanas’s Free Exercise rights were violated 
when he was denied the use of his rosary and prayer book, barred from seeing his 
priest and deacon, and by having his faith denounced as witchcraft.277  Additionally, 
the ACLU argued that Hanas’s Establishment Clause rights were violated through 
his involuntarily indoctrination into the Pentecostal faith through forced scriptural 
study, examination on Pentecostal tenets, and mandatory attendance at religious 
services.278   
On May 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals denied the application for leave to appeal 
in a one-sentence order.279  Hanas next sought review in the Michigan Supreme 
Court.280  On January 27, 2005, the Michigan Supreme Court, by a 4-3 vote, denied 
the application for leave to appeal.281  Hanas then filed a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari in the United States Supreme Court on April 26, 2005.282  The Petition was 
                                                                
271Id. at 4-5.  Had Hanas not objected to the religious indoctrination at Christian Outreach, 
it appears very likely that he would have successfully completed the program and avoided a 
sentence.  Despite Hanas’s disagreements with Christian Outreach’s “treatment approach,” 
Pastor Rottier stated on the record that Hanas had “done good” while he was a resident there.  
Id. at 5 n.5. 
272Id. at 5. 
273Id. 
274Id. 
275Id.  
276See Defendant’s Delayed Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 21. 
277See id. at 4. ACLU attorneys argued that the actions of Christian Outreach staff were 
imputed to the government by (1) the fact that he was sentenced there in the first place and (2) 
the statement of the probation officer at the hearing: “And remember, the rules of Pastor 
Rottier’s program are the rules of the court.”  Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus, supra note 6, at 12. 
278Defendant’s Delayed Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 21. 
279Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 6, at 6. 
280Id. 
281Id.  
282Id. 
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denied on June 20, 2005.283  On December 6, 2005, Hanas filed a Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus in the Southern Division of the Eastern District Court of Michigan.284  
On September 14, 2006, the court granted a request to hold the case in abeyance 
pending resolution of Hanas’s civil rights case.285  Until his probation ends on March 
13, 2007, Joseph Hanas remains under the supervision of the Genesee County Adult 
Probation Department.286  It remains uncertain whether he or others in similar straits 
will soon be afforded the relief they seek—suing over forced participation in a faith-
based treatment model is indeed “an arduous and time-consuming procedure.”287 
F.  Summary of the Case Law 
The common denominator among the four adjudicated cases is the importance of 
“true, private choice” in evaluating both secular and faith-based options presented to 
the offender.  Although courts may offer and even encourage participation in a faith-
based residential treatment center, they must provide meaningful secular alternatives 
to survive Establishment Clause scrutiny. 
These cases make clear that directly funded faith-based treatment centers may not 
use religious or twelve-step tenets in their approaches or engage in religious 
practices.  What remains unclear is the extent to which indirectly funded treatment 
centers may do so.  For example, DeStefano, which involved direct funding, showed 
that facility staff members may not coerce clients to attend A.A. meetings and cannot 
push specifically religious or twelve-step principles.  Teen Ranch, however, showed 
that a facility’s religious practices are permissible as long as the funding remains 
“indirect,” whether through a voucher system where the beneficiary voluntarily 
confers the funds on a religious institution or where the offender verbally 
acknowledges his desire to enter a faith-based institution instead of a secular one.  
Thus, the prohibited activities in Destefano (nightly staff readings of A.A. literature, 
discussion of A.A. at the facility’s events, playing videotapes focusing on the twelve 
steps, etc.) would presumably be permissible at an indirectly funded facility where 
the offender freely chooses to be there, having passed over equivalent secular 
facilities. 
V.  PRESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS 
Religious organizations play an important role in reducing substance abuse 
problems.  Indeed, many faith-based organizations run excellent addiction treatment 
and prevention programs.  Additionally, spirituality is a key aspect of prominent and 
well-respected twelve-step groups that have helped millions of people achieve 
                                                                
283Id. 
284Id. at 17. 
285Hanas v. Genesee County Adult Prob. Dep’t, No. 05-CV-74612, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
65614 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 14, 2006).  
286Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 6, at 5. 
287PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 126. 
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lasting sobriety since their inception.288  The people whom these programs help most, 
though, are those that voluntarily seek them out.289  
Regardless of whether faith-based treatments are the most effective way to 
combat substance abuse, the fact remains that a certain percentage of offenders will 
not respond favorably to such religious messages.  There are those who argue that 
such objectors are simply in denial and are unwilling to accept that a religious (or 
spiritual) program may be the answer to their problems.  While that may well be true 
for some offenders, others are genuinely offended by the prospect of bringing God 
into the realm of addiction.  In any event, the question is inapposite—the authenticity 
of individuals’ private religious beliefs is an area into which the government may not 
inquire.290  
Our government has a significant interest in arresting the addictions of all 
people—not just those who will subscribe to a faith-based approach.  Essential to an 
alcoholic or addict’s recovery is his or her “buying into” the program that is 
offered.291  Those “who are personally invested in their recovery achieve better 
results.  Thus, programs that alienate participants, or pressure an unwanted belief 
system on them are unlikely to assist individuals in overcoming their addiction.”292  
Protecting the First Amendment rights of all offenders sentenced to residential 
treatment will not only help ensure the best chance of aiding the recovery of as many 
alcoholics and addicts as possible, but will also go a long way toward preventing 
lawsuits of the kind discussed in this Note from ever being filed.  
Unfortunately, utter confusion currently reigns in this area of law.  Many 
probation and parole officers, treatment center administrators, and even seasoned 
members of the judiciary remain unaware of what constitutes acceptable sentencing 
practices and the types of practices in which treatment centers may engage.293  
Hanas’s case effectively illustrates the disturbing consequences of this ignorance.  
Regrettably, his case is not an isolated incident.294  Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
                                                                
288See supra note 27. 
289Rudolf H. Moos & Bernice S. Moos, Paths of Entry Into Alcoholics Anonymous: 
Consequences for Participation and Remission, 29 ALCOHOLISM: CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL 
RES. 1858 (2005).  Granted, there are individuals who would not otherwise have explored 
options such as A.A. and who give substantial credit to their sentencing judge for the 
introduction to the fellowship (affectionately referred to as the “nudge from the judge” in A.A. 
circles).  However, just because some people are able to “see the light” and be helped “against 
their will” does not necessarily imply that such “nudging” is good policy.  Regardless, this 
Note argues that imposing such sentences is constitutionally impermissible.  
290United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965). 
291See Gallas, supra note 33, at 1100-01; Dehn, supra note 29; author’s personal 
observations and conversations with individuals in recovery. 
292Gallas, supra note 33, at 1098.  Further, taxpayers do not want to see governmental 
funds expended for no benefit. 
293Ronald D. Hester, Spirituality and Faith-Based Organizations: Their Role in Substance 
Abuse Treatment, 30 ADMIN. & POL’Y MENTAL HEALTH 173 (2002); Telephone interview with 
Max Dehn, Associate, Cavitch, Familo, Durkin & Frutkin (Oct. 10, 2005) [hereinafter 
Interview with Max Dehn].   See also Dehn, supra note 29.  
294See, e.g., Editorial, Keeping the Faith; Even Best Government Programs Cannot be 
Allowed to Preach Religion, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 1, 2003, at 8A (questioning the 
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even in the states and jurisdictions covered by the decisions discussed above, 
probation and parole officers appear reluctant to accept those rulings and continue to 
refer offenders solely to twelve-step or religiously based treatments.295  Judges across 
the country persist in sentencing offenders to A.A., N.A., and faith-based treatments 
with little or no consideration given to the constitutional implications that such 
sentencing practices raise.296  A certain few judges may be seriously disregarding 
current law because they truly believe that twelve-step or faith-based treatments are 
in the best interests of the offenders.297  Given the overwhelming prevalence of 
twelve-step-based treatment sentences, it is imperative that the Supreme Court grant 
certiorari to one of these cases in order to resolve the conflict among the Circuits 
with regard to A.A.’s status as a religion vis-à-vis the Establishment Clause.  The 
High Court also has yet to delineate the precise boundaries within which drug courts 
may operate. 
Administrators of substance abuse treatment facilities rarely possess law degrees.  
They typically do not have constitutional scholars on staff.  Although the motives 
and intentions of the vast majority of administrators are presumably pure, seemingly 
innocent missteps across Establishment Clause boundaries can result in profound 
consequences of liability, as seen in the cases above.  Offering training programs and 
Continuing Legal Education (CLE) seminars with extended Q&A sessions where 
members of the bar (particularly drug court judges) could learn about recent 
decisions in this arena, acceptable sentencing schemes, and permissible conduct 
within the walls of treatment centers would greatly improve the current state of 
ignorance that pervades this area of law.  Similar programs would be highly 
advisable for treatment center administrators as well.  Board-Certified Substance 
Abuse Counselors (BCSACs) are, like members of the legal profession, obligated to 
                                                          
constitutionality of forcing prisoners at the Franklin County Work Release Facility to attend a 
weekly program that uses a faith-based approach to conquering drug and alcohol addiction 
(also run by members of the Pentecostal faith)); Catherine Gabe, Agnostic Questions if AA is 
the Way; He Challenges Order to Attend Meetings or Face Jail for DUI, PLAIN DEALER 
(Clev.), Jan. 6, 2003, at A1 (recounting the story of a man who chose to spend thirty days in 
jail rather than attend A.A. meetings). 
295PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 126; Interview with Max Dehn, supra note 293; see also 
sources cited supra note 294. 
296PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 126; Interview with Max Dehn, supra note 293; see also 
sources cited supra note 294. 
297PEELE ET AL., supra note 39, at 126; see also sources cited supra note 294.  Again, these 
judges may be absolutely correct.  See supra note 289; see also supra text accompanying note 
235.  Nevertheless, such a judicial philosophy can have unconstitutional effects.  It also strikes 
your author as rather egotistical and contrary to the judicial oath.  See 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2006). 
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satisfy continuing professional education requirements.298  These seminars present an 
ideal opportunity to discuss recent relevant legal developments.299  
Before addressing what measures should be taken to protect drug and alcohol 
offenders’ First Amendment rights, it is well to keep in mind the words of Judge 
Stanley Goldstein, the country’s very first drug court judge:  
Don’t lose sight of the objective.  We are [in this] to get these people off 
of drugs, to retrain them, to rehabilitate them . . . [and to] let them become 
tax-paying citizens.  We are not there to fast-track them into jail, to trick 
them, or to play games.  We are there for specific purposes.300  
However, judges’ motives and intentions need not be wholly altruistic.  Successful 
drug court interventions also place less of a strain on limited budgets and stem 
criminal activity in general, improving the quality of life for the community.  Any 
prescriptive suggestions should, therefore, be geared toward all these objectives. 
Although current statutes impose fairly well-defined regulations and 
programmatic safeguards301 regarding federally funded treatment centers, the statutes 
do not apply to treatment centers not receiving federal funds.302  The Charitable 
Choice regulations303 already applicable to federally funded facilities provide a good 
jumping-off point for discussing potential regulation of treatment centers not 
currently subject to those rules.  Various municipalities’ policies and directives can 
be instructive as well. 
When the decision is made to enroll an offender in a residential substance abuse 
treatment program, several things need to happen in order to ensure First 
Amendment compliance.  Other measures, while perhaps not constitutionally 
mandated, are also recommended with an eye toward policy.  First, the offender 
should be presented with genuine options: some offenders may in fact desire a 
                                                                
298International Certification & Reciprocity Consortium/Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse, 
Inc., Standards for Certified AODA Counselors, http://www.icrcaoda.org/standards_for_ 
certified_aoda_cou.htm (last visited May 28, 2006).  Each state has its own re-certification 
standards that substance abuse counselors must meet.  However, fully 6.8% of publicly funded 
treatment centers do not employ any certified substance abuse counselors.  ROMAN ET AL., 
supra note 68, at 9.  States should require counselors at publicly funded treatment centers to be 
properly certified. 
299Some may already do so.  It would be advisable, in any event, to bring in an informed 
judge or a constitutional scholar knowledgeable on the issue.  For an instructive pamphlet, see 
JOHN B. ORR, USC CENTER FOR RELIGION AND CIVIC CULTURE, A PRIMER FOR FAITH-BASED 
ORGANIZATIONS (n.d.), available at http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/private/docs/ 
publications/primer.pdf (last visited May 28, 2006).  
300NOLAN, supra note 37, at 106. 
301See supra notes 30, 167, 168. 
302Some treatment center administrators deliberately forgo federal funding because doing 
so would mean they might have to alter their treatment approach to conform to the Charitable 
Choice regulations currently applicable only to federally funded treatment centers.  See supra 
notes 30, 31.   
303See supra note 30. 
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religious or spiritual approach,304 while others will find it aversive.  “Some people in 
need respond to religious messages but not secular ones, and other people in need 
respond to secular messages but not religious ones.  The only way to help both 
groups is to make available both religious and secular providers.”305  Toward this 
end, offenders should receive as much information about available facilities as 
possible (e.g., brochures, websites, program literature, and interviews with facility 
administrators, other staff, and previous residents).  Both secular and religious 
alternatives should be clearly identified on this menu of options.  Offenders should 
be given a reasonable period of time306 during which they could review their options 
and select their preferred institution.307   
In McCallum, the Division of Community Corrections had in place an 
administrative directive reminiscent of the “informed consent” doctrine.  That 
directive “required probation and parole agents to inform offenders of the religious 
content of the treatment program [being suggested], to obtain the offender’s consent 
to participate in the program, and to document the offender’s choice to 
participate.”308  Although this is an admirable policy, it could go further to ensure 
offenders enter a faith-based treatment center with “eyes wide open.”  Offenders 
should be informed about the specific religious nature of the program309 and told 
exactly what will be expected of them.  Instead of hearing about the program through 
a probation or parole officer, or through another drug court “team member,” 
                                                                
304While nothing prohibits a judge from sentencing an offender to a purely secular facility 
(and, in fact, it presumably would not offend the Free Exercise Clause for a drug court judge 
to sentence offenders solely to secular facilities), this author is aware of at least a handful of 
drug court participants who specifically desired to attend a twelve-step-based facility.  If 
reaching the objectives just spoken of is our goal, then good policy suggests that a menu with 
both secular and faith-based/twelve-step facilities should always be offered.  
305Hearing, supra note 25, at 25 (prepared statement of Mr. Douglas Laycock, Associate 
Dean for Research and Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law, The University of Texas 
Law School).  Given that offering options to the offender has been a key issue in the civil 
rights lawsuits discussed in Part IV, courts would be well-advised to document in their journal 
entries that both twelve-step/faith-based and secular options were, in fact, presented to the 
offender. 
306A week should be a reasonable time for an offender to review his or her options, place 
the appropriate phone calls and e-mails, and make an informed decision as to which treatment 
center would be the best match. 
307Granted, a certain portion of offenders have no desire to rid themselves of their 
addiction and are merely looking to escape the shackles of the criminal justice system as 
quickly as possible.  However, if the judge has already determined that a residential treatment 
sentence is appropriate and all the facilities listed on the court’s “menu” are duly licensed and 
have valid contracts with the court, the offender will not really be “getting away” with 
anything—and he may even end up learning something in the process. 
308Freedom from Religion Found. v. McCallum, 214 F. Supp. 2d 905, 910 (W.D. Wis. 
2002), aff’d, 324 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003).  A later policy directive mandated that a secular 
alternative had to be presented alongside the faith-based option.  Id. at 912.  
309Offenders should be informed, for example, if the treatment center adopts the beliefs or 
tenets of a particular faith, if it is strictly twelve-step-based, or if the twelve steps are ignored 
altogether. 
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offenders should be able to communicate directly with an administrator at the 
facility.  This would greatly aid them in making a truly informed decision. 
Alternatively, a judge may order an offender to enroll in a state-licensed 
residential treatment program of his or her own choice without naming any specific 
program, and extend to the offender a voucher redeemable at that facility.310  Never 
should lack of funds be an obstacle to matching an offender with the most 
appropriate treatment facility.311  Freedom of religion ought not come with a price 
tag.  Next, if the offender chooses a twelve-step or faith-based facility, he must be 
informed in writing that he has the right to request a timely transfer to a comparable 
facility if, after a reasonable period of time312 after taking up residence, he finds the 
religious philosophy or religious practices of the treatment center objectionable.313   
The alternative provider need not be a secular organization.  It must simply be a 
provider to which the recipient has no religious objection.  A judge should not, in 
any way, penalize an offender for exercising his right to that end.  
Offenders should be informed that they are under no obligation to participate in 
prayer or other religious activities, and that there will be no consequences for 
refusing to do so.314  Courts should announce that they will not enforce the 
acceptance of religious beliefs or practices, and that offenders are free to accept or 
reject the entirety of any treatment program, including the tenets and beliefs 
professed therein.  While McCallum held that parole officers may recommend a 
particular faith-based treatment center to their parolees, it remains questionable 
whether a judge could do so.  Regardless of the constitutionality of such a practice, it 
is inadvisable.315  Officers of the court should stop well short of encouraging the 
embrace of religious beliefs professed at a treatment facility.316  One of the goals here 
                                                                
310This author is aware of at least one judge, Kathleen Ann Sutula of the Cuyahoga County 
Common Pleas Court in Cleveland, Ohio, who takes this approach.  
311This is easier said than done, of course.  Governmental budgetary constraints are 
perpetual. 
312Two to three weeks would probably be sufficient time to be able to make an informed 
decision on this matter. 
313A sample notice to individuals receiving substance abuse services may be found at 42 
C.F.R. pt. 54a app. (2006).  The notice used in the McCallum case is in the published opinion.  
See Freedom from Religion Found. v. McCallum, 214 F. Supp. 2d 905, 913 (W.D. Wis. 2002), 
aff’d, 324 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003).  Of course, problems could theoretically arise if a 
belligerent offender repeatedly requested transfers.  After a second or third transfer request, 
when the judge has good reason to believe the offender is just being obstinate, that judge 
should have the discretion to then simply order the offender into a purely secular facility.  
Your author doubts this would be a real problem, though.  While some offenders may abuse 
the system while in treatment, repeatedly requesting transfers would only prolong the 
individual’s institutionalization. 
314Aside from judicially imposed consequences, treatment centers often impose their own.  
See discussion supra Part II.C.  Choosing not to participate in religious activities (i.e., saying 
the Serenity prayer before a morning meditation) must not be allowed to have any negative 
repercussions—either in court or within the facility itself. 
315Such a practice would come dangerously close to failing the endorsement test. 
316For example, explicitly recommending a particular faith-based treatment center would 
essentially have the effect of placing the imprimatur of government on a specific religion. 
38https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss4/8
2006] PRAYER OR PRISON 709 
is to separate the private religious choices and commitments of offenders from 
government influence.  Courts have long acknowledged the importance of autonomy 
in shaping personal religious views.317 
Any treatment center contracting with a court to receive offenders should, at a 
minimum, follow the guidelines laid out in the relevant Charitable Choice sections of 
the Code of Federal Regulations.318  These guidelines include a prohibition on 
spending governmental funds on inherently religious activities, such as worship, 
religious instruction, or proselytization.319  Although a facility may offer such 
activities, it must offer them separately in time or location from the programs or 
services for which it receives governmental funds, and participation must be strictly 
voluntary.  Facilities must not be permitted to discriminate in any way against 
referred offenders on the basis of religion, religious belief, refusal to hold a religious 
belief, or a refusal to participate in a religious practice.  Public money comes from 
every American taxpayer regardless of race, religion, creed, national origin, 
disability, sexual orientation, or identity.  Accordingly, treatment centers benefiting 
from those funds must conform to principles of tolerance and inclusiveness. 
Finally, all contracting facilities must be held accountable to established 
standards of care, performance, and licensure so that residents are able to recover 
from their addictions with dignity, accompanied by all the rights to which they are 
entitled.  Just as with health and medical care for other illnesses, states must have the 
power to require uniform licensing or certification for all addiction treatment 
programs (and particularly their counseling personnel) to maximize the life-saving 
power of these services.  Indeed, many faith-based programs around the country 
currently operate effectively while being held accountable to such standards.  To ask 
that the remainder conform to these preexisting standards in order to receive 
government funding and court referrals is not unreasonable.  
Each of these requirements should be written into every contract between a court 
and a treatment center accepting that court’s offenders.  Failure to abide by such 
requirements should be grounds for contract termination, as it is principally those 
failures that invite civil rights lawsuits.  Thus, judges should be well-acquainted with 
the administrators, philosophy, and daily routines at the facilities with which their 
courts contract.  Adopting these measures will go a long way toward ensuring that a 
judge’s overall sentencing scheme will survive constitutional challenge. 
                                                                
317See generally Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 
192 (1973); see also Dehn, supra note 29. 
318See supra note 30. 
319See 42 C.F.R. §§ 54.4, 54a.4 (2006).  There exists an important distinction between a 
center that adopts a religious philosophy and one that engages in actual religious practices.  
For example, St. Christopher’s Halfway House, supra note 31, is based primarily on a twelve-
step approach.  Residents are permitted to attend weekend religious services of their choice, 
but are in no way required to do so, and no consequences, real or intangible, are attached to a 
decision not to attend.  See discussion supra notes 31, 83.  Most residents, in fact, do not 
attend.  Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery; 
Interview with Preston W. Elder, supra note 31. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Treatment for petty drug and alcohol offenses in lieu of ordinary prosecution is 
rapidly becoming the contemporary standard.  Government is also increasingly 
subsidizing faith-based substance abuse treatment centers.  Throughout our history, 
faith-based organizations have made impressive and deeply important contributions 
to social well-being in America.  Twelve-step and faith-based substance abuse 
treatment centers are no exception.  These organizations and institutions have 
garnered the respect and approval of the citizenry.  Nevertheless, among the many 
faith-based treatment centers that are performing admirable work within the confines 
of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, there are still those that harbor 
ulterior motives and intentions.  As Joseph Hanas’s case and others illustrate, 
offenders are still being sentenced to such facilities.  These sentencing practices raise 
serious constitutional issues. 
Drug courts are the chief referrers of offenders to residential treatment programs.  
Characterized by collaborative links between the courts, prosecutors, public 
defenders, law enforcement, treatment providers, and social service agencies, these 
specialty courts have exploded in growth since their inception in 1989.  Although 
they have their critics, drug courts have proven to be an effective tool in combating 
both individual offenders’ addictions and their attendant societal consequences. 
Life inside a typical treatment center is not easy.  Residents can expect a rigid 
structure applied to their lives, along with strict rules, regulations, and accountability.  
Many treatment centers incorporate elements of twelve-step groups such as A.A. into 
their teachings and philosophy.  Others adopt the beliefs and tenets of specific 
organized religions. 
The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment govern the 
types of conduct that are permissible at these facilities.  The two Clauses are 
frequently in tension and occasionally overlap in the case law.  Although both 
Clauses state important rights, the Establishment Clause is most often implicated in 
cases involving allegations of improper religious conduct at treatment centers.   
The Supreme Court has not settled upon a one-size-fits-all Establishment Clause 
test.  Instead, four different approaches to the Establishment Clause have emerged: 
separation, coercion, endorsement, and neutrality.  Each approach has its own 
corresponding test.  Recently, the Supreme Court has somewhat departed from the 
Lemon/Agostini test, reflective of the separationist view, and appears to be 
increasingly moving toward the neutrality approach. 
Consistent with the neutrality view of the Establishment Clause, Congress 
enacted Charitable Choice in 1996 and expanded the legislation to include substance 
abuse treatment in 2001.  Although faith-based organizations had long been able to 
receive governmental funds for providing social services, Charitable Choice made it 
significantly easier for them to do so.  With regard to substance abuse treatment 
centers, Charitable Choice laid down several fundamental guidelines designed to 
protect residents’ First Amendment rights that continue to be enforced today at 
federally funded facilities. 
Since Charitable Choice’s enactment, five cases have directly addressed faith-
based substance abuse treatment centers.  The four adjudicated civil rights lawsuits 
illustrate the importance of providing offenders “true, private choice” in deciding 
where they will take up residence.  The cases also draw an important distinction 
between directly and indirectly funded facilities.  The former receive governmental 
aid as a matter of course, independent of residents’ choices to be there.  The latter 
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receive governmental aid only when an individual specifically chooses that facility in 
a voucher-like system.320  Courts have held that where an offender independently 
chooses to confer a governmental benefit upon a faith-based institution, that 
individual’s choice effectively acts as a “circuit breaker” between the government 
and religion.  Any resultant religious or spiritual teachings that occur within that 
facility’s walls can, therefore, be attributed to the individual’s choice instead of the 
government’s.  
Despite these rulings, many lawyers, judges, probation and parole officers, and 
treatment center administrators remain confused or ignorant about the current state of 
the law in this arena.  The Supreme Court has been less than helpful by refusing to 
review cases involving these important issues.  Consequently, many courts and 
treatment centers operate in a sort of ‘no man’s land,’ devoid of any concrete laws 
regulating permissible judicial sentencing schemes or defining allowable conduct 
within treatment centers themselves.  While Charitable Choice regulations provide 
guidance for those facilities that are federally funded, many other treatment centers 
receive no federal funding and are, therefore, “outside the law.”   
A fairly common saying heard within the rooms of Alcoholics Anonymous is that 
“A.A. is not for those who need it.  It’s for those who want it.”321  The same 
philosophy should apply to twelve-step and faith-based treatment centers.  Spiritual 
approaches to battling addiction have been around for hundreds of years,322 but they 
only work if treated persons “buy into” such a philosophy.  Government has an 
interest in seeing all people afflicted with addiction recover.  Thus, both twelve-
step/faith-based and secular options should be presented to all individuals sentenced 
to residential treatment.  Offenders should be given ample time to explore and 
research all their available options before selecting the institution they believe will 
offer them the maximum benefit.  Further, judges should make clear to offenders that 
the court does not endorse and will not require acceptance of any of the beliefs or 
tenets professed at any treatment center.  The current applicable Charitable Choice 
regulations323 should be incorporated into every contract between treatment centers 
and courts, regardless of a treatment center’s sources of funding.  Finally, states must 
have the power to ensure that every contracted treatment center, along with its staff, 
is fully accredited, licensed, and compliant with regulations protecting residents’ 
religious rights.324   
                                                                
320It is important to note that it is not necessary for the funds to pass directly through the 
beneficiary’s hands in the form of a tangible, paper voucher.  See, e.g., Teen Ranch v. Udow, 
389 F. Supp. 2d 827, 834 (W.D. Mich. 2005).  A verbal choice is sufficient, but such an 
acknowledgement must have the same symbolic purpose and effect as a voucher.  See id. 
321Author’s personal observations and conversations with individuals in recovery. 
322See, e.g., WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A STUDY IN 
HUMAN NATURE 268 (Prometheus Books 2002) (1911). 
323See supra note 30. 
324Thirteen percent of the 362 publicly funded treatment centers surveyed in the Roman 
study were accredited by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Health Care 
Organizations (JCAHO).  Similarly, 15.6% of the public centers were accredited by the 
Rehabilitation Accreditation Commission (CARF).  Nearly 2% of the public centers were 
accredited by both JCAHO and CARF.  Seventy-two percent of the centers held neither 
JCAHO nor CARF accreditation.  While only a small proportion of the public centers were 
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Implementing these measures will ensure the constitutionality of a court’s 
sentencing scheme and decrease the probability of civil rights lawsuits.  Just as 
importantly, however, it will increase the probability that offenders enter treatment 
centers with an open mind and a sense of security.  This improves the chances of 
lasting recovery, ultimately realizing the broader societal goals of the drug court 
movement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
accredited by JCAHO or CARF, nearly all of the centers in this sample (98.9%) were state 
licensed.  ROMAN ET AL., supra note 68, at 6.  This data suggests that states may need to be 
more discriminating in licensing treatment centers.  
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